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ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos*

Election law doctrine has long been dominated by rights-and-interests
balancing: the weighing of the rights burdens imposed by electoral
regulations against the state interests that the regulations serve. For the last
generation, the election law literature has emphasized structural values that
relate to the functional realities of the electoral system, competition chief
among them. This Article introduces a new structural theory—the alignment
approach—that has the potential to reframe and unify many election law
debates. The crux of the approach is that voters’ preferences ought to be
congruent with those of their elected representatives. Preferences as to both
party and policy should correspond, and they should do so at the levels of
both the individual district and the jurisdiction as a whole.
The areas the alignment approach could reorient include franchise
restriction, party regulation, campaign finance, redistricting, and minority
representation. For instance, measures that hinder voting could be
conceived not as rights violations or efforts to suppress competition, but
rather as partisan distortions of the electorate. Similarly, campaign finance
regulations could be assessed based on their capacity to shift candidates’
preferences toward those of their constituents (and away from those of their
donors). And the key issue for district plans could be whether they properly
align the jurisdiction’s median voter with the legislature’s median member.
The alignment approach is attractive because it stems from the core
meaning of democracy itself. If it is the people who are sovereign, then it is
their preferences that should be reflected in the positions of their
representatives. The approach also is appealing because of the support it
finds in the Supreme Court’s case law. While the Court has never embraced
the approach explicitly, it has often recognized the significance of preference
congruence. However, it is important not to overstate the approach’s utility.
Other election law values matter too and cannot be disregarded. Moreover,
many of the factors that produce misalignment are non-legal and thus cannot
be addressed by law reform alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Something important is missing from the prevailing judicial and
academic accounts of many election law issues. Consider the spate of
franchise restrictions that states around the country recently have enacted:
photo ID requirements for voting, proof-of-citizenship requirements for
registering to vote, cutbacks to early voting, and the like.1 According to the
Supreme Court, the only cognizable harm that these policies may inflict is a
burden on the individual right to vote. The policies should be upheld if they
are tied closely enough to the state’s alleged interests in preventing fraud and
improving election administration. According to most of the legal literature,
franchise restrictions should be assessed based on their implications for
structural values such as competition and participation. The validity of the
policies should hinge on whether they entrench incumbents in office or deter
many people from engaging in the political process.
But the uproar over photo ID requirements and their ilk has not arisen
primarily—or even mostly—because of concerns about liberty, competition,

1
See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTING LAW CHANGES 1-6, 17-21 (2012) [hereinafter BRENNAN
CTR. UPDATE] (describing franchise restrictions adopted by nineteen states in 2011-12 period); BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTING LAW CHANGES IN 2012, at 1-36 (2012). Other new restrictions included
limiting voter registration drives, eliminating election day registration, and making it more difficult to
restore voting rights to ex-felons. See id.
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or participation. The main objection to the measures, rather, is that they
disproportionately prevent certain kinds of people from voting: minorities,
the poor, the young, in a word, Democrats. As Judge Evans of the Seventh
Circuit has written, in a rare judicial acknowledgement of this point, “Let’s
not beat around the bush . . . [photo ID laws are] a not-too-thinly-veiled
attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew
Democratic.”2 Uneven declines in turnout, of course, may produce different
election outcomes from those that would have arisen in the absence of the
franchise restrictions. More Republican candidates may prevail due to the
change in the composition of the electorate. Above all, it is this potential
partisan distortion, not the worries identified by courts and scholars, that
fuels the controversy over the “new vote denial.”3
Next, consider the record spending that took place during the 2012
campaign: about $6.3 billion in federal races alone, a sum 20% higher than
in 2008 and 100% higher than in 2000.4 According to the Court, the only
problem with this spending is quid pro quo corruption, the explicit exchange
of money for political favors. The legal literature highlights a broader range
of concerns, including unequal influence over the electoral process and
reduced competition due to the financial advantage of incumbency. But to
many observers, an even more urgent issue is the imbalance in the resources
available to the two major parties.5 If one party enjoys a substantial financial
edge (as the Republicans did in 20126), and if dollars spent have an impact
on votes received, then election outcomes may deviate from what they would
have been in an environment with more even outlays. The fear that voters
may be swayed by asymmetric spending animates much of the popular
conversation about campaign finance—but is largely absent from the judicial
and academic debate.
Last (for now), consider redistricting, the decennial redrawing of district
lines, whose most recent iteration generated 197 lawsuits in 42 states,7 as
well as howls of outrage when Republicans retained their House majority in

2
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., dissenting),
aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
3
See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006) (coining the phrase).
4
See Total Cost of U.S. Elections (1998-2012), OPENSECRETS.ORG (last visited Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.php [hereinafter Total Election Cost].
5
One of these observers is former president Bill Clinton. See Noam Levey, Clinton: GOP Money
Advantage Could Still Swing the Election, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/
sep/23/news/la-pn-clinton-top-money-20120923.
6
See 2012 Presidential Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG (last visited Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.
opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php (Republican spending on presidential race totaled $1.25 billion
compared to $1.11 billion for Democrats); Stats at a Glance, OPENSECRETS.ORG (last visited Aug. 1,
2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/index.php (Republicans outspent Democrats $580 million to
$475 million in House races and $377 million to $309 million in Senate races); 2012 Outside Spending, by
Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG (last visited Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
summ.php?disp=R (pro-Republican outside groups outspent pro-Democratic outside groups by $834
million to $501 million).
7
See Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING (last visited Aug. 1, 2013),
http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php.
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2012 despite receiving 1.4 million fewer votes nationwide than their
opponents.8 The Court has floundered for decades in its efforts to determine
why (and whether) gerrymandering might be unconstitutional. The most
prominent recent scholarship argues that the practice’s core harm is the
decline in competition that ensues when bipartisan plans shield incumbents
from electoral challenge.
But the most glaring problem with
gerrymandering—the problem that spawned the term two centuries ago—is
the partisan havoc that it may wreak. Clever district configurations may give
rise to legislatures whose composition diverges sharply from the will of a
majority of voters. This sort of mismatch arose in several states in 2012, and
it is the quintessential injury inflicted by gerrymandering.
A common thread runs through all of these examples. In each case, an
electoral practice may produce a misalignment between the preferences of
voters and the preferences of their elected representatives. In each case, this
misalignment is precisely what is objectionable about the practice (even if it
is not all that is objectionable). And in each case, both the doctrine and the
legal literature seem oddly uninterested in the misalignment. They plainly
are missing something important.9
The purpose of this Article, then, is to introduce the alignment approach
to election law.10 By alignment I mean that the preferences of voters are
congruent with the preferences of their elected representatives. Preferences
with respect to two concepts are relevant here: first, partisan affiliation, so
that if a majority of voters wish to be represented by a candidate from a
certain party, this in fact is who represents them; and second, public policy,
so that if most voters hold a certain ideology or issue position, their
representative tends to do so as well. Alignment also operates at two distinct
levels: first, within a particular district, so that the preferences of the
district’s median voter are aligned with those of the district’s representative;
and second, within a jurisdiction as a whole, so that the preferences of the
jurisdiction’s median voter are aligned with those of the legislature’s median
member. The median voter and legislator bear special significance under the
alignment approach because it is only they who speak by definition for a
popular or legislative majority.
While there is no particular locus classicus for the alignment approach in
the democratic theory literature, an impressive range of thinkers have made
the normative argument that the preferences of voters ought to be aligned

8

See, e.g., Republicans Win Congress as Democrats Get Most Votes, BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 18,

2013).
9
Misalignment also could be conceived in agency cost terms as the divergence between the interests
of the principal (the electorate) and of agents (elected representatives). See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave,
Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 706 (2013). I prefer the terminology of alignment
because it lends itself more easily to the various classifications that I employ in the Article (partisan versus
policy alignment, and district-specific versus legislative alignment).
10
Cf. Edward B. Foley, Election Law and the Roberts Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 734 (2007)
(imploring scholars to “offer the Supreme Court ideas and principles concerning their field as a whole” in
order to “make[] the cumulative body of the Court’s precedent cohere as a sensibly unified law”).
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with those of their representatives—and that elections are the key instrument
for producing this alignment. For example, Hanna Pitkin, the famed scholar
of representation, once wrote that “[o]ur concern with elections and electoral
machinery . . . results from our conviction that such machinery is necessary
to . . . secure a government responsive to public interest and opinion.”11
Similarly, Joseph Bessette, one of the pioneers of the deliberative democracy
movement, has commented that “[t]he chief mechanism for ensuring a
reliable link between the deliberations of representatives and the interests and
desires of the represented is the electoral connection.”12 The alignment
approach may be new to election law, but it is hardly unfamiliar to
democratic theory.
And in fact the alignment approach is not entirely new to election law.
Hints of it are evident in the Court’s great one-person, one-vote decisions, in
which the Justices made clear that legislatures must accurately reflect the will
of the electorate. Intimations of it also can be found in the Court’s campaign
finance case law, in which the argument appears on occasion that
contributions may be regulated in order to prevent politicians from
embracing the views of their donors rather than of their voters. In the legal
literature as well, the responsiveness that many scholars value is not so
different a concept from alignment. Responsiveness refers to the rate at
which legislative preferences change given some shift in voters’ preferences,
while alignment denotes the congruence of these preferences. Both terms
share the premise that, in a democracy, public policy ultimately must be tied
to public opinion.
Still, there is no question that the alignment approach is not the Court’s
usual approach in election law cases. To the extent the Court has an
overarching theory in this domain, it is that valuable individual rights—
speech, association, and the franchise—sometimes are burdened by
regulations of the political process, and that in such circumstances it is the
Court’s duty to weigh the burdens against the countervailing interests served
by the regulations. This methodology has little in common with the
alignment approach’s emphasis on the correspondence between voters’ and
representatives’ preferences. Analogously, the dominant theory in the legal
literature, that electoral practices should be assessed based on their
implications for competition, is largely orthogonal to the alignment approach
in terms of values and prescriptions. Competition and alignment may both
be important democratic principles, but there is no reason to expect them to
be especially highly correlated. Electoral systems easily may be competitive
but misaligned, or uncompetitive but properly aligned.
The payoff of the alignment approach is that it reframes—and provides a
common vocabulary for analyzing—an array of election law issues. For
instance, partisan misalignment, the divergence between voters and

11
12

HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 234 (1967).
JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON 36 (1994).
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representatives in terms of partisan preference, is a serious concern in the
franchise restriction, campaign finance, and party regulation contexts. In the
franchise restriction context, the misalignment occurs when the median
actual voter (who is pivotal to the representative’s election) differs from the
median eligible voter who would have gone to the polls in the absence of the
measure at issue. In the campaign finance setting, the misalignment arises
when asymmetric spending creates a gap between the median actual voter
and the median hypothetical voter exposed to more even outlays. And in the
party regulation arena, an even starker sort of misalignment ensues when the
presence of a third party on the ballot, enabled by a lax regulation, results in
the victory of a candidate not even preferred by the median actual voter.
In all of these cases, partisan misalignment produces policy misalignment
too: the divergence between voters and representatives in terms of policy
preferences. But other common electoral scenarios may generate policy
misalignment even if there is no partisan misalignment. For example, the
contributions that fuel modern campaigns may cause representatives’ issue
preferences to reflect the views of their donors rather than those of their
constituents. Likewise, closed primaries, which are used by about half the
states, may encourage candidates to embrace the opinions of party activists
instead of general election participants. And districts that are highly
heterogeneous may make politicians more susceptible to partisan pressures
since the signals they receive from their constituents are more difficult to
interpret.
The above examples all involve district-level harms that may then
aggregate into partisan or policy misalignment at the legislative level. But
legislative misalignment also may be brought about directly by redistricting.
Shrewd district lines may cause the party preferred by the median voter in a
jurisdiction not to win a majority of the jurisdiction’s seats. The partisan
divergence is obvious in this case, and so too, given the parties’ very
different issue stances, is the resulting gap in policy preferences between the
median voter and the median representative. Ironically, efforts to augment
minority representation may give rise to the same kind of legislative
misalignment.
Minority-heavy districts often are very safe for the
Democrats, so if too many of them are drawn, Republicans may end up
winning a majority of a jurisdiction’s seats even if they do not enjoy the
support of a majority of the jurisdiction’s voters.
In addition to reframing these issues, the Article draws on work by
political scientists to estimate the extent of the misalignment in each context.
For instance, photo ID requirements reduce turnout by 2-3%, on average, and
result in a net pro-Republican swing of 1-2%.13 The latter figure represents
the partisan misalignment between the median actual voter and the median
eligible voter who would have gone to the polls in the absence of the

13

See infra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
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restriction. Similarly, the voting records of representatives are about six
times more reflective of the views of affluent contributors than they are of
the opinions of the median-income constituent.14 This differential constitutes
the policy misalignment between the representative and the median voter.
And in the most recent election, congressional district plans featured an
average partisan bias of about 10%.15 If the disadvantaged party had won
50% of the vote (and the support of the median voter), it would have won
only 40% of the seats (and not the allegiance of the median legislator).
To be clear, the Article does not claim that alignment is the only value
that is relevant to the resolution of election law disputes. Individual rights
(the Court’s mainstay) and electoral competition (the darling of the legal
literature) plainly are implicated in many cases, as are participation, political
equality, minority representation, and a host of other considerations. The
Article’s aim is to draw attention to a vital democratic principle that has been
underappreciated to date—not to displace all other election law theories.
Misalignment also is not a problem that is caused or can be solved by the law
alone. The factors that produce misalignment (particularly of the policy
variety) include internal legislative structures, powerful political parties,
politicians’ perceptions of their constituents’ preferences, politicians’ own
ideologies, the geographic distribution of the parties’ supporters, and singlemember districting itself. Many of these factors are political; some are
historical or psychological; but none clearly lies within law’s empire.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I surveys the existing accounts of
election law disputes and identifies a crucial value—the alignment of voters’
and representatives’ preferences—that courts and scholars largely have
neglected. Part II explicates the alignment approach. It outlines the
approach’s intellectual and doctrinal origins, explains what it is that ought to
be aligned, and argues for the importance of preference congruence in a
democracy. Part III, the pragmatic core of the Article, uses the alignment
approach to reconceptualize a series of election law debates. It covers topics
including franchise restriction, party regulation, campaign finance,
redistricting, and minority representation. Lastly, Part IV sets forth some of
the limits of alignment. It stresses the plurality of election law values as well
as the constraints on what the law alone can achieve.
One final introductory point: The Article’s rationale for introducing the
alignment approach is not just that it redirects attention to a key issue in
many election law cases. It is also that the problem of misalignment has
never been greater in modern American history. Franchise restrictions that
distort the composition of the electorate have surged in popularity in recent
years.16 The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC17 has

14

See infra notes 241-247 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 280-281 and accompanying text.
16
See BRENNAN CTR. UPDATE, supra note 1, at 1-6, 17-21.
17
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
15
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opened the floodgates to much higher and more uneven campaign spending.
The partisan bias of congressional district plans reached a forty-year high in
the 2012 election.18 Conversely, the congruence between House members’
voting patterns and constituents’ opinions is now at a forty-year low.19
Under these circumstances, it is not only scholars who may benefit from a
renewed focus on preference alignment. It is also American democracy
itself.
I.

WHY ELECTIONS?

In a well-known 2002 essay, Samuel Issacharoff posed the provocative
question: Why elections?20 Why, that is, do we use the ballot box to decide
who will have the privilege of governing us? Issacharoff asked this question
not as a democratic theorist but rather as an election law scholar. His aim
was to formulate a theory that could both explain what is at stake in electoral
disputes and guide courts in their resolution of these disputes. As he put it, a
central task “in developing an organic view of the law of the political process
is to provide a more robust understanding of what justifies . . . judicial
intervention into the political domain.”21
I begin this Part by distilling from its case law the theory, such as it is, on
which the Supreme Court relies to explain its activity in the election law
arena. In brief, the Court’s view is that regulations of the political process,
though they may serve many worthwhile state interests, also may burden
valuable individual rights. The Court’s duty is to ensure that the interests
served by the regulations are worth the burdens imposed on the rights. I next
describe the most prominent academic accounts of the harms that may arise
in the electoral context and the ways that courts should strive to ameliorate
them. Some scholars are sympathetic to the Court’s framework of rights
balanced against interests. But the dominant perspective in the legal
literature—the one that Issacharoff adopted to answer his “why elections”
question—is that structural values, competition chief among them, provide
the appropriate prism for making sense of the law of democracy. Finally, I
argue that both the doctrine and the literature largely have overlooked the
vital value of aligning the preferences of voters with those of their elected
representatives. Like competition, alignment is a structural value that does
not fit easily into the Court’s rights-and-interests framework. But unlike

18

See infra notes 280-281 and accompanying text.
See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 136, 151 (2001); John D. Griffin, Party Polarization and Representation 11 (2013).
20
See Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684 (2002).
21
Id. at 684; see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1137 (2002) (arguing that ideal theory of judicial intervention in election law domain
“would combine the constitutional text, with its silences, and its vagueness . . . in addition to substantive
principles of democratic theory”).
19
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competition, alignment has not yet been advanced as a unifying election law
principle.
A. The Court’s Answer
The closest the Supreme Court has come to articulating a general theory
of judicial activity in the election law domain is its discussion of rights and
interests in the 1992 case of Burdick v. Takushi.22 The Court stated that “the
rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends
upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.”23 If the burden on these rights—speech,
association, and the franchise—is “‘severe,’” then the regulation must be
“‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’”24
On the other hand, if the burden is more moderate, then “‘important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’” the regulation. 25
Courts almost always employ this approach in franchise restriction and party
regulation cases.26 They also use a variant of it in the campaign finance
context, subjecting expenditure limits (which are thought to impose a heavy
burden on the freedom of speech) to stricter scrutiny than contribution caps
(whose burden is seen as lighter).27 Related rights-and-interests tests are
applied as well in certain kinds of redistricting28 and minority
representation29 disputes.
What seems to underpin this framework is a commitment to optimizing
the simultaneous protection of individual rights and realization of state

22
504 U.S. 428 (1992). Burdick drew in turn on a number of earlier Court precedents, most notably
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). See id. at 786-90 (setting forth similar framework of
individual rights balanced against countervailing state interests); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 317 (2007) (noting that in
Burdick the Court “undertook to restate the doctrines governing constitutional challenges to electoral
mechanics”).
23
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
24
Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
25
Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
26
Some notable examples include Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-91
(2008), Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357-59 (1997), and Tashjian v. Rep. Party
of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986). See also Richard L. Hasen, The “Political Market” Metaphor and
Election Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 719, 721 (1998) (describing “current Supreme Court approach to election
law in which the government provides a reason or reasons justifying the law, and the Court balances those
reasons against any infringement on individual rights”); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics
as Markets, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 645 (1998).
27
See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 241-42, 246-47 (2006); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
19-24 (1976) (per curiam); see also Elmendorf, supra note 22, at 357-61 (“[I]t is . . . appropriate to view
the Court’s recent contribution limit jurisprudence as substantially informed by . . . the electoral
mechanics case law.”).
28
See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740-41 (1983) (inquiry in malapportionment context
weighs dilution of right to vote against state interests such as compactness and respect for political
subdivisions).
29
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-27 (1995) (inquiry in racial gerrymandering
context weighs representational harm against state interests such as remedying effects of past
discrimination and complying with Voting Rights Act).

9

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

interests. The rights that may be encumbered by regulations of the political
process are very important. The franchise, in particular, is a “fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society” because “the right to exercise [it] in
a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights.”30 But the interests served by electoral regulations are highly
significant as well. Goals such as avoiding voter confusion, ensuring that
elections run smoothly, and preventing political corruption are essential both
on their face and in the eyes of the Court.31 Confronted with pressing
concerns on both sides of the ledger, the Court consistently casts itself in the
role of balancer-in-chief. It assesses, on an ad hoc basis, the magnitude of
the burdens that are imposed and the interests that are advanced, and it
validates only those regulations that, in its view, confer policy benefits that
outweigh their rights costs. Its apparent philosophy is that judicial
intervention is justified in the election law arena in order to provide the
optimal mix of rights protection and interest promotion.
Two related points about this philosophy are worth stressing. The first is
that it is indistinguishable from the Court’s approach to constitutional
disputes outside the electoral context. The Court carries out the same sort of
rights-and-interests balancing in free speech, equal protection, and due
process cases that do not involve any electoral issues. As Richard Pildes has
put it, the Court’s framework “is conventional because it imports into the law
of democracy the same doctrinal tools, legal tests, and ways of framing the
issues from more fully developed areas of constitutional law.”32 The second
point is that the Court does not base its theory of election law on any
substantive value that the democratic process is meant to realize, such as
competition, participation, or alignment. The state may invoke a democratic
value as a justification for burdening an individual right, but there is
otherwise no place for democracy in the Court’s theory. In the (rather harsh)
words of Richard Posner, the Court has “failed to articulate a coherent
conception of democracy even though the relation between law and
democracy is fundamental to the proper role of judges in a democratic
society.”33

30
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (asserting that
freedoms of speech and association “‘lie[] at the foundation of a free society’” (quoting Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960))).
31
See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796 (1983) (“There can be no question about the
legitimacy of the State’s interest in fostering informed and educated expressions of the popular will in a
general election.”); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (describing “the
importance of preventing both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the
eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption”).
32
Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J.
685, 687 (2004); see also James A. Gardner, The Dignity of Voters—A Dissent, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 435,
438 (2010) (“Democratic politics is not . . . treated differently from any other arena of governmental and
citizen activity.”).
33
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 111 (2003); see also Heather K.
Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1427 (2002);
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 646 (“[T]he Court’s electoral jurisprudence lacks any underlying
vision of democratic politics that is normatively robust or realistically sophisticated . . . .”).
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To be fair, the Court does sometimes use techniques other than rightsand-interests balancing to decide election law cases. Particularly in the
redistricting and minority representation contexts, the Court often conceives
of the harms it is seeking to cure in terms that do not involve infringements
of individual rights. The “consistent degradation” of a party’s “influence on
the political process,”34 a racial group’s diminished “opportunity . . . to elect
legislators of [its] choice,”35 and a district plan’s conveyance of the “message
that political identity is . . . predominantly racial,”36 all are not rights-related
injuries—but all have motivated the Court’s interventions in these areas. It
also is not the case that the Court has failed entirely to ground its election law
decisions in democratic values. Issacharoff has identified an array of cases in
which the Court hinted at the importance of holding representatives
accountable to their constituents.37 Later in the Article, similarly, I highlight
several doctrinal passages that reveal the Court’s occasional appreciation of
the alignment principle.38
Notwithstanding these caveats, it is clear that the Court’s dominant
election law theory is the concurrent optimization of individual rights and
state interests. It also is clear that this theory does not include a major role
for any substantive democratic value. Next, I consider the accounts that
scholars have put forward of the harms in election law cases and the ways in
which courts should address them. Some academics support the Court’s
rights-and-interests balancing; others are passionate advocates of a structural
theory of election law; and still others aim to reconcile the two sides of the
heated balance-versus-structure debate.
B. Balance Versus Structure
To begin with, a number of prominent scholars agree with the Court that
its task should be to balance the rights burdens imposed by electoral
regulations against the interests that the regulations serve. These scholars do
not necessarily concur with the Court’s conclusions in each case, but they are
receptive to the notion of the Court as ultimate assessor of burdens and
interests. Richard Hasen, for example, has written that he “agree[s] with the
Court’s jurisprudence that a balancing of interests is required when a
plaintiff’s assertion of a . . . right is defended by the state’s assertion of a

34
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion) (stating standard for partisan
gerrymandering challenges).
35
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (stating standard for racial vote dilution challenges
under Fourteenth Amendment).
36
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996) (plurality opinion) (stating standard for racial
gerrymandering challenges).
37
See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605-06
(2002); see also Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
29, 46 (2004) (“[T]he actions of courts in this domain reveal that they are enforcing structural values
concerning the democratic order as a whole, albeit erratically and not always self-consciously . . . .”).
38
See infra Section II.C.
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government interest.”39 Likewise, Bruce Cain has commented that it is
“important that the courts balance [election] laws against the rights of voters,
candidates, parties, and groups to determine whether they are constitutionally
permissible.”40 And Nathaniel Persily has argued that it is unsurprising—
indeed commendable—that “[t]he Court’s jurisprudence in ‘democracy’
cases . . . flows logically from or fits comfortably within larger constitutional
doctrines.”41
The prevailing position in the legal literature, however, is that the
Court’s discourse of rights and interests fails to capture what is truly at stake
in election law cases.42 What is at stake, on this view, is irreducibly
structural: the relationships between candidates, groups, and parties, the
allocation of power between different political actors, and the operation of
the electoral system as a whole. It is these structural factors—summarized
by Pildes as the “interlocking relationships of the institutions . . . that
organize the democratic system”43—that explain why much election law
litigation is launched in the first place. It is also these factors that are most
affected, for good or for ill, by the outcomes of the litigation. Accordingly,
they should be the focus of the Court’s jurisprudence, not rights and interests
that are linked only tenuously to the underlying functional realities.
The ranks of the structuralists include Issacharoff, Pildes, and Posner, as
well as Justice Breyer,44 Christopher Elmendorf,45 Heather Gerken,46 Michael
Kang,47 Pamela Karlan,48 Michael Klarman,49 Daniel Ortiz,50 Spencer
Overton,51 and David Schleicher.52 But while these scholars agree on the
unsuitability of the Court’s framework, they are divided as to what the most
important structural consideration might be. Electoral competition is the
value that most of them favor; as Issacharoff and Pildes put it in their seminal

39

RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 97 (2003).
Bruce E. Cain, Garrett’s Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1603 (1999).
41
Nathaniel Persily, The Search for Comprehensive Descriptions and Prescriptions in Election Law,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1509, 1515 (2003); see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory
of Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL
PROCESS 283, 297-302 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002) (arguing that Supreme Court should not try to
develop a theory of democracy to apply in election law cases).
42
See HASEN, supra note 39, at 139 (referring to structuralism as the “new election law orthodoxy”);
Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1290 (2011)
(describing the “emerging consensus hold[ing] that courts ought to focus on ‘structural’ benefits and
harms”).
43
Pildes, supra note 37, at 41.
44
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005).
45
See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation, 35 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 643 (2008).
46
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004).
47
See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734 (2008).
48
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2001).
49
See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997).
50
See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217 (1999).
51
See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631 (2007).
52
See, e.g., David Schleicher, “Politics as Markets” Reconsidered, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 163
(2006).
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1998 article, “[o]ur aim is to read into the Constitution an indispensable
commitment to the preservation of an appropriately competitive political
order.”53 On the other hand, Justice Breyer,54 Elmendorf,55 and Overton56
have argued for the primacy of voter participation, considered in the
aggregate rather than individually. Under either account, election law
disputes should be analyzed directly in terms of their implications for the
relevant structural value. Courts should invalidate practices that unjustifiably
suppress competition (or turnout), and uphold practices that do not.57
Both the competitive and the participatory variants of structuralism
derive from normative visions of a properly functioning democracy.
According to its proponents, competition is necessary for the achievement of
two key democratic goals: accountability, the ability of voters to oust from
office politicians whose records they dislike, and responsiveness, the degree
to which shifts in voters’ preferences result in changes in the composition
(and policies) of the government.58 Similarly, participation is lauded by its
advocates because it enhances the legitimacy of electoral outcomes, exposes
politicians to more of the public’s views, and connects voters more closely to
their representatives.59
Competition and participation therefore are
instrumental rather than intrinsic values. They matter not for their own sake
but because they allegedly make possible a healthy democratic order.
A final group of scholars do not fit easily into either the balancing or the
structuralist camps. Their hallmark, in fact, is that they hope to bridge the
divide between the camps, to forge a synthesis between individual- and
polity-centered theories of election law. For instance, Guy-Uriel Charles has
argued that electoral disputes are inherently dualistic, in that they involve
both genuine rights claims and consequences for underlying political
arrangements. Courts should (and do) consider both of these aspects when
resolving the disputes.60 Likewise, Daniel Farber has proposed an approach
that “lies somewhere between structuralism and the traditional conception of
individual rights,” in that it recognizes systemic harms but asks courts to
address them only when they are manifested in identifiable individual

53
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 716; see also, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 37, at 615;
Kang, supra note 47, at 738 (defining and arguing for “democratic contestation”); Klarman, supra note 49,
at 497-98 (defining and arguing for “anti-entrenchment”); Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 459, 485-90 (2004); Pildes, supra note 32, at 688.
54
See BREYER, supra note 44, at 5.
55
See Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 653.
56
See Overton, supra note 51, at 673; see also Spencer Overton, The Donor Class, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 73, 105 (2004).
57
See Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1113 (2007)
(“[Structuralists] argue that . . . in the law of democracy, courts ought to serve those structural goals more
directly.”).
58
See Issacharoff, supra note 37, at 600, 615-16; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 646;
Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (1999).
59
See Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 677; Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1705, 1710 (1993); Overton, supra note 51, at 636, 657.
60
See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1113-31 (2005).
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injuries.61 And Joseph Fishkin has contended that the appropriate judicial
methodology varies based on the doctrinal context. Rights-and-interests
balancing works well in franchise restriction cases, while structural analysis
is necessary in areas such as redistricting and minority representation.62
Much more could be—and has been63—said about the roiling theoretical
debate in the election law literature. But my aim in describing the debate
was not to cover its every nuance, but rather to demonstrate that the
alignment approach, despite its intuitiveness, has not yet been advanced in
any sort of systematic fashion. In the next Section, I explain how the
approach draws, but also stands distinct, from much existing doctrine and
scholarship. Alignment is related to other structural values (and their
democratic ends), but it is far from the same thing.
C. The Missing Structural Value
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s framework, it is clear that balancing
rights and interests is different from aligning voters’ and representatives’
preferences. No individual right to a properly aligned representative has ever
been recognized by the Court. Nor would such a right make any conceptual
sense, since it is only the median voter, not every voter, whose preferences
have normative significance under the alignment approach. The median
voter is pivotal because, by definition, she speaks for a majority of all voters.
Non-median voters have no comparable claim that their preferences should
be shared by their representatives.
It is true that alignment may be invoked doctrinally as a justification for
burdening an individual right. In fact, as I discuss later in the Article, the
concept occasionally has surfaced in Court opinions in precisely this
manner.64 But states only rarely try to defend their electoral regulations
against rights challenges by pointing to the regulations’ aligning attributes.
And even if states more often mounted such defenses, courts still would be
able to endorse alignment only in cases where rights claims triggered judicial
review in the first place. Courts would not be able to strike down
misaligning practices that do not burden any individual rights. Nor would
courts be able to strike down misaligning practices that do burden rights (at
least on the basis of the misalignment), since interests other than alignment
obviously would be used to justify the practices.

61
62

See Daniel A. Farber, Implementing Equality, 3 ELECT. L.J. 371, 377 (2004).
See Fishkin, supra note 42, at 1292; Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1888, 1893

(2012).
63
Works that discuss this debate in more detail include HASEN, supra note 39, Charles, supra note
60, Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J.
1411 (2008), Fishkin, supra note 42, Luke P. McLoughlin, The Elysian Foundations of Election Law, 82
TEMP. L. REV. 89 (2009), Pildes, supra note 58, and Yen-Tu Su, Retracing Political Antitrust, 27 J.L. &
POL. 1 (2011).
64
See infra Section II.C.
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Of course, it is unsurprising that the alignment approach cannot be
reconciled with the Court’s rights-and-interests balancing. Alignment is a
quintessential structural value—a value that matters to the entire polity, not
to any particular group or individual—and the whole point of the structuralist
critique is that the Court’s jurisprudence does not adequately account for
such values. How, then, does alignment relate to the literature’s favored
values of competition and participation? Are they actually distinct concepts?
They plainly are. Competition refers above all to the margin of victory
in elections, though it also covers related ideas such as how often incumbents
are defeated, how many campaigns are uncontested, and what proportion of
races are expected (even if they do not turn out) to be close.65 At the level of
an individual district, it is easy for an election to be competitive but to
produce partisan or policy misalignment. For example, one candidate may
receive 48% of the vote, another candidate may receive 45%, and a third
candidate may get 7%, all of whom prefer the second candidate to the first.
This election is extremely competitive, with a margin of victory of only 3%,
but it also results in a winner who is not preferred by the median voter.
Similarly, even in a two-party election, a candidate may win a close race but
may then start casting votes in the legislature that diverge sharply from the
preferences of the median voter. In this (all too common 66) scenario, a high
level of competition is compatible with significant policy misalignment.
At the level of the legislature as well, a competitive district plan is not
necessarily a properly aligned one. Suppose that a state has ten districts and
a thousand voters, of whom 55% are Republicans and 45% are Democrats.
Suppose also that eight of the districts elect Democrats by a 52%-48%
margin and two of them elect Republicans by a 83%-17% margin. The
median margin of victory is just 4% in this case but the partisan
misalignment is staggering—Democrats prevail in eight of the ten districts
even though the median voter is a Republican. Conversely, imagine that six
of the districts elect Republicans by a 65%-35% margin and four of them
elect Democrats by a 60%-40% margin. The median margin of victory is
30% in this case, a very high level, but there is no partisan misalignment at
all. The median voter is a Republican and so is the median representative.
That alignment is not the same thing as participation is even clearer.
Considered in the aggregate, participation refers to the rate of voter turnout in
an election.67 Alignment and turnout simply are unrelated concepts. Voters’
and representatives’ preferences may be aligned whether turnout is high or

65

See Issacharoff, supra note 37, at 620-30 (discussing competition in all of these senses).
See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional
Roll-Call Voting, 26 LEG. STUD. Q. 533, 541 (2001) (showing that distribution of legislators’ roll-call
votes is far more bimodal than distribution of constituents’ opinions); Joseph Bafumi & Michael C.
Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519, 528 (2010) (same); Seth E.
Masket & Hans Noel, Serving Two Masters, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1, 6 (2011) (same).
67
See Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 690-91; Fishkin, supra note 42, at 1301; Overton, supra note 51,
at 672-74.
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low, just as they may be misaligned no matter how many or how few people
show up at the polls. To be sure, there may be links between alignment and
turnout, but, if so, this is because the concepts are connected by certain
causal chains, not because they are alternative terms for the same
phenomenon.
But recall from the above discussion that competition and participation
are instrumental rather than intrinsic values—values that matter, above all,
because of the kind of democracy that they allegedly bring about.68
Interestingly, alignment is related more closely to the democratic ends of
competition and participation than it is to the values themselves.
Competition, first, is deemed vital by its proponents because it increases
responsiveness,69 which in turn has been defined as a “positive correlation
between opinion and policy”70 or the “degree to which the partisan
composition of the legislature responds to changes in voter preferences.”71
Responsiveness is similar to alignment in that it too describes how public
opinion is linked to important outputs such as legislative composition,
politicians’ voting records, and actual public policy. It too acknowledges
that, in a democracy, the will of the people ultimately should be sovereign.72
But responsiveness differs from alignment in that it refers to the rate at
which these outputs change given some shift in public opinion. Alignment,
in contrast, denotes whether or not the outputs are congruent with the
public’s preferences.73 To illustrate the difference, suppose that in one
election the Democrats receive 51% of a state’s vote and 41% of the state’s
seats, and that in the next election they receive 52% of the state’s vote and
49% of its seats. Both elections result in partisan misalignment between the
median voter and the median representative. But in tandem the elections
reflect an extremely high level of responsiveness—an 8% swing in seats for
just a 1% swing in votes. Analogously, imagine (quite plausibly74) that a
politician is highly unlikely to vote for same-sex marriage when 55% of his
constituents support the policy, but highly likely to do so when 65% support
it. Then the politician’s preferences are misaligned with those of the median
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See supra 58-59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 58.
70
Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148,
148 (2012).
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Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 541, 542 (1994).
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More specifically, some responsiveness is necessary to achieve alignment whenever public
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As Lax and Phillips explain, “Policy adoption may increase with higher public support (suggesting
responsiveness), but policy may still often be inconsistent with majority opinion (suggesting a lack of
congruence).” Lax & Phillips, supra note 70, at 148; see also Boris Shor, All Together Now 2 (Apr. 25,
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voter at the 55% point but properly aligned at the 65% point. And
responsiveness is very high when public opinion moves from 55% to 65%
but very low for all other opinion shifts.
Competition theorists might respond that I am taking their references to
responsiveness too literally. Competition, they might argue, promotes both
responsiveness and alignment. The trouble with this claim (aside from the
fact that it has not been made) is that, empirically, there is only a weak
relationship between competition and alignment.
Voters’ and
representatives’ preferences are only slightly more congruent in highly
competitive districts than they are in highly uncompetitive districts.75 The
levels of policy misalignment in highly competitive districts still are
staggering.76 The evidence that competition fosters alignment therefore is
much less compelling than the evidence that it fosters responsiveness (which
includes a strong negative correlation between responsiveness and the
average margin of victory in a jurisdiction).77 At the very least, if alignment
were one’s core democratic objective, one would not seek to achieve it
primarily by making elections more competitive.
As for participation, one of the democratic goals that it is supposed to
attain is the enhancement of the legitimacy of electoral outcomes.78
Outcomes are more legitimate, according to Elmendorf, when “the
distribution of interests and concerns among the voting public [mirrors] the
corresponding distribution within the normative electorate as a whole.”79
Asking how similar the preference distributions are of actual voters and of
eligible voters, it is true, is similar to asking how aligned the preferences are
of the median actual voter and of the median eligible voter. However, one
difference between the approaches is that a preference distribution is more
complex, and more difficult to analyze, than the mere position of the median.
Another difference is that distributional alignment is not ultimately a
majoritarian value, but rather one that sounds primarily in the register of
proportional representation. Moreover, the skewing of distributions of
“interests and concerns” corresponds to only one kind of misalignment:
policy misalignment at the district level. To the extent that other kinds of
misalignment are troubling as well—such as partisan misalignment and

75
See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 19, at 145 (finding that shift from 30% margin of victory to
perfect tie increases candidate convergence by only 0.069 points on 0 to 1 scale); Thomas L. Brunell &
Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting on District Homogeneity, Political Competition,
and Political Extremism in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1962 to 2006, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT 117, 132 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2011) (showing almost no relationship between
Democratic share of two-party House vote and representative’s voting record).
76
See id.
77
According to data on file with the author, this correlation was -0.72 for state legislative elections
held between 1968 and 2012. See also John D. Griffin, Electoral Competition and Democratic
Responsiveness, 68 J. POL. 911, 919 (2006) (finding that “as competitiveness within districts increases,
legislators become more responsive to changes in their districts’ liberalism”).
78
See supra note 59.
79
Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 675-76; see also Fishkin, supra note 42, at 1308-09; Overton, supra
note 51, at 668-69.
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misalignment at the legislative level—such skewing is an inadequate
articulation of the democratic harm.
Why has the legal literature overlooked a value as seemingly intuitive as
alignment?80 One answer is that scholars may have supposed, incorrectly,
that the democratic ends advanced by their own preferred values are
functionally identical to alignment. They may have thought that by arguing
for responsiveness or for undistorted preference distributions they also were
arguing for a properly aligned political system.81 Another answer is that the
empirical advances that have made possible the quantification (and
comparison) of voters’ and representatives’ policy preferences are very
recent. Until the last few years, alignment could have been proposed as a
normative ideal, but it could not have been measured with any confidence.
A final explanation for the oversight is that, over the last generation,
“debates about democratic theory” in the legal literature “have been
organized around conflicts between competitive and rights-oriented
conceptions of democracy.”82 Scholars have quarreled extensively about
whether electoral disputes are better conceived in competitive or in rights
terms—but they have neglected, for the most part, the exploration of other
democratic values. This Article’s introduction of the alignment approach
therefore is similar to the efforts by certain scholars to stress the significance
of voter participation.83 It too is an attempt to raise the profile of a crucial
value that has been underappreciated to date.
II. THE ALIGNMENT APPROACH
In order to raise the profile of alignment, of course, it is necessary to
define the concept carefully, to identify its intellectual and doctrinal origins,
and to explain why it is normatively attractive. Alignment cannot possibly
be embraced until it is clear what it is. In this Part, then, I begin the project
of explicating and defending the alignment approach. I first discuss what
ought to be aligned and at which levels. It is voters’ partisan and policy
preferences that should correspond to those of their representatives, and these
preferences should match within both each district and the jurisdiction as a

80
Of course, alignment has not been overlooked entirely by the literature. Some of the works that
have addressed it in passing include Charles, supra note 21, at 1146, Karlan, supra note 59, at 1717,
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not By “Election” Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1181
(1999) (criticizing “structural obstacles to the realization of majority preferences in American
democracy”), and Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 805 (2001) (describing skeptically a “system that intends to channel elections toward
the choice of the median voter”).
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Cf. POSNER, supra note 33, at 165 (conflating “responsiveness to public opinion” with “align[ing]
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Pildes, supra note 32, at 686; see also Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding
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whole. Partisan and policy alignment are related in interesting ways, as are
district-specific and legislative alignment.
Next, I consider what the democratic theory literature has to say about
alignment. An overlapping consensus exists, among several sorts of thinkers,
that voters’ and representatives’ preferences should be congruent. One
therefore can adhere to any of several perspectives on democracy and still
regard alignment as an important value. From theory I then move on to
doctrine. In the Supreme Court’s case law too, the significance of alignment
has been recognized in contexts including party regulation, campaign
finance, and redistricting. The Court rarely has focused on alignment, but it
often has acknowledged it. Finally, I articulate what I take to be the
normative appeal of the alignment approach. By emphasizing how closely
voters’ and representatives’ preferences correspond, the approach directs our
attention to the crux of what it means to be a democracy. The people only
rule—we only have a kratos of the demos—when the views of the governed
and of the governing ultimately are consistent.
A. Conceptual Framework
The most obvious question about the alignment approach is what should
be aligned—and the most obvious answer is voters’ and representatives’
partisan preferences.84 If a majority of a jurisdiction’s voters prefer Party A
to Party B, then a politician from Party A should represent the voters. The
partisan preference of the median voter should correspond to the partisan
affiliation of the representative. Any other outcome would be undemocratic
because it would thwart the unambiguous will of the majority.
This point likely seems correct but banal. Of course, the majority’s
partisan preference should not be frustrated, but how can it be frustrated? In
fact, partisan misalignment can arise in two distinct ways (even in an election
that is not rigged). First, in a race with multiple candidates competing for a
single position under a plurality voting rule—a common scenario in the
United States—the candidate preferred by the median voter easily can fail to
be elected. Suppose that Candidate A receives 48% of the vote, Candidate B
receives 45%, and Candidate C gets 7%, and that all of Candidate C’s
supporters prefer Candidate B to Candidate A. In this case, Candidate A is
elected even though the electorate prefers Candidate B by a 52%-48%
margin.85 This kind of misalignment is depicted in Figure 1, and it occurs
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Although this section is largely descriptive, it inevitably includes more normative elements as
well. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 6 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that discussions of democracy
“involve necessarily . . . a shifting balance between descriptive-explanatory and normative statements”).
Section II.D, infra, presents a more explicitly normative case for the alignment approach.
85
This is the same hypothetical that I used earlier to demonstrate the difference between alignment
and competition. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66; see also G. Bingham Powell & Georg S.
Vanberg, Election Laws, Disproportionality, and Median Correspondence, 30 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 383, 399
(2000) (“[T]he presence of multiple parties may split the votes in a way such that the party closest to the
median is not even the plurality winner.”).
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whenever the median voter’s partisan preference is not satisfied due to the
way the vote is divided among multiple candidates.
FIGURE 1: PARTISAN MISALIGNMENT DUE TO MULTIPLE CANDIDATES

Second, even in a two-party race in which the partisan preference of the
median actual voter necessarily is satisfied, the partisan preference of a
different person with normative significance may not be realized. A
disjunction then emerges between the median actual voter (whose preferred
candidate is elected) and the normatively significant person (whose preferred
candidate is not). Imagine that a majority of eligible voters who would like
to vote—a group with clear normative appeal—prefer Candidate A to
Candidate B. Imagine too that some of these people are prevented from
voting by a franchise restriction, and that Candidate B ends up receiving the
most votes. Then Candidate B prevails, because he is the choice of the
median actual voter, but his election is troubling because he is not the choice
of the median eligible voter who would have participated in the absence of
the restriction. This type of misalignment is illustrated in Figure 2, and it is
possible whenever the actual electorate is distorted relative to the normative
electorate.86
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See Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 677 (arguing that “a representative voting public best
approximates the electoral ideal in which public officials are chosen by and accountable to the normative
electorate as a whole”).

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

20

To be clear, the alignment approach does not assist in the selection of the
normatively significant person whose partisan preference should be satisfied.
This figure can be chosen only on the basis of other democratic values, such
as civic participation or political equality.87 But once this figure has been
picked, the alignment approach provides a useful framework for analyzing
electoral policies. Policies that widen the gap between the median actual
voter and the normatively significant person are problematic because they
make it more likely that the latter figure’s preferred candidate will fail to be
elected. Conversely, policies that shrink the gap are appealing because they
reduce the odds of such wrong-winner outcomes.
FIGURE 2: PARTISAN MISALIGNMENT DUE TO DISTORTION OF ELECTORATE

While partisan alignment is a crucial first step, alone it does not suffice
to realize key democratic values. For the will of the people actually to be
authoritative, representatives should share not only median voters’ partisan
preferences but also their policy preferences—that is, their general political
ideologies as well as their views on more specific policy matters.88 Only

87
See infra Sections III.A, C (discussing the median eligible voter who wishes to participate in an
election and the median hypothetical voter exposed to even campaign expenditures).
88
See Barry C. Burden, Institutions and Policy Representation in the States, 5 STATE POL. & POL’Y
Q. 373, 374 (2005) (noting importance of both “general policy representation” and “representation on
particular issues”).
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policy alignment enables constituents to exercise genuine substantive control
over their representatives.
Partisan alignment merely ensures that
constituents can pick their representatives’ party labels, which is quite a
modest conception of popular sovereignty. As political theorist Michael
McDonald has written, “To be truly democratic, the rules for [elections]
should empower the voter median by ensuring that it is also the policy
position of the [representative].”89
Policy misalignment is almost inevitable whenever there is partisan
misalignment. Since the parties hold different policy views,90 if the partisan
preferences of the median voter91 and the representative are not congruent, it
is a virtual certainty that their policy preferences also will be at odds. But
policy misalignment can arise as well in the absence of partisan
misalignment. Even if the partisan affiliation of the representative is
consistent with the wishes of the median voter, the representative’s policy
stances might not be.
The representative might compile a highly
conservative voting record while the median voter prefers center-right
moderation. Or the representative might support universal health insurance
while the median voter prefers a more limited expansion of existing
government programs. This characteristic kind of policy misalignment, in
which the representative’s views are more extreme than those of the median
voter, is shown in Figure 3.92

89
Michael D. McDonald et al., What Are Elections For? Conferring the Median Mandate, 34 BRIT.
J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2004). For examples of other works that treat policy alignment as normatively desirable,
see G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY (2000) (“In contemporary
democracies elections are supposed to establish connections that compel or greatly encourage the
policymakers to do what the citizens want.”); Bafumi & Herron, supra note 66, at 519; Matt Golder &
Jacek Stramski, Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 90 (2010); and
John D. Huber & G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Congruence Between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions
of Liberal Democracy, 46 WORLD POL. 291 (1994).
90
See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 19, at 138 (finding an “enduring historical pattern in American
politics” that “[c]andidates diverge at the district level, just as parties diverge nationally”).
91
As discussed above, one kind of partisan misalignment involves a divergence between the median
voter and the representative, while the other kind involves a gap between the median actual voter and
another figure with normative significance. I use “median voter” here as shorthand for both types of
misalignment.
92
See supra note 66 (citing findings by political scientists that representatives generally are more
extreme than their constituents).
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FIGURE 3: POLICY MISALIGNMENT DUE TO REPRESENTATIVE’S EXTREMISM

A potential concern about policy alignment is that it may be impossible
to determine voters’ and representatives’ policy preferences, let alone to
collapse them onto a single common axis that enables their comparison.
Fortunately, political scientists recently have made great strides in
quantifying policy views using tools such as surveys, interest group ratings,
and voting records.93 The most exciting new work takes advantage of
surveys answered by both voters and representatives to plot their positions in
a common policy space.94 Political scientists also have determined that, at
least over the last generation, policy preferences with respect to a vast array
of issues can be captured by a single left-right dimension corresponding to
governmental intervention in the economy.95
A second dimension

93
See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., supra note 19, at 140 (using National Political Awareness Test
(NPAT)); Bafumi & Herron, supra note 66, at 522-25 (using Cooperative Congressional Election Study
and voting records); Cheryl Boudreau et al., Legal Interventions in the Market for Political Information
10-11 (2013) (using surveys and voting records); Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary
Election Systems and Representation, 14 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 304, 313 (1998) (using Americans for
Democratic Action ratings); Thad Kousser et al., Reform and Representation 7 (2013) (using NPAT and
surveys); Shor, supra 73, at 3 (same).
94
See, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note 66, at 522-25; Boudreau et al., supra note 93, at 10-11;
Kousser et al., supra note 93, at 7; Shor, supra note 73, at 3.
95
See NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA 22 (2006) (finding single policy dimension
for members of Congress); Boudreau et al., supra note 93, at 10-11 (same for San Francisco
representatives and voters); Shor, supra note 73, at 12-13 (same for state legislative members and voters).
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corresponding to civil rights views formerly was necessary as well, but has
receded in importance since the 1970s.96 Voters’ and representatives’
ideologies therefore seem both intelligible and relatively simple in
structure.97 There is little risk of them falling victim to familiar traps such
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem or Condorcet’s Paradox.98
Of course, voters’ views on specific policy matters often are less stable
and intense than their overall political ideologies. A voter may be a
committed liberal or conservative, as a general matter, but may not have a
consistent or strongly held position on a particular policy question. Overall
ideological alignment, then, is more important than alignment on each
individual issue that appears on the political docket. Similarly, persistent
policy misalignment is more problematic than misalignment that is
temporary and that soon resolves. Indeed, short-term deviations from
constituents’ preferences, in the form of logrolling and tactical concessions,
sometimes may promote long-term congruence. Accordingly, the subset of
policy misalignment that is most worrisome is ongoing ideological
misalignment. Time-limited and issue-specific instances of noncongruence
more easily may be forgiven.
To this point, the discussion has assumed that it is a single
representative’s preferences that should be congruent with those of a
district’s median voter. But alignment is a useful concept at the level of not
only the individual district (where there is one representative) but also the
jurisdiction as a whole (where there are many). At the latter level, it is the
preferences of the legislature’s median representative that should correspond
to those of the jurisdiction’s median voter. This kind of correspondence—
legislative alignment rather than district-specific alignment—makes it more
likely that the balance of power in the legislature will reflect the balance of
opinion in the electorate. It makes it more likely that the views of the
jurisdiction’s median voter in fact will be followed. As Robert Weissberg
has observed, “Th[e] dyadic perspective (i.e., one legislator and one
constituency) is surely important, but it is not the only way of approaching
representation. . . . [A] long and equally valid tradition exists that views
representation in terms of institutions collectively representing a people.”99

96
See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 95, at 24 (showing decline over time in classificatory utility of
second dimension).
97
See Stephen A. Jessee, Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
59, 72 (2009) (finding that “not only do ordinary citizens possess real ideological beliefs, but also these
beliefs map onto specific policy proposals in much the same way as do the ideologies of senators and the
president”).
98
See MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS TO THE PROBABILITY
OF MAJORITY DECISIONS (1785); Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J.
POL. ECON. 328, 329 (1950) (arguing that if people’s preferences are non-transitive then no voting system
can meet three basic fairness criteria).
99
Robert Weissberg, Collective Vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 535,
535 (1978); see also, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note 66, at 519 (distinguishing between “micro-level”
alignment at district level and “macro-level” alignment between “aggregate American voter preferences
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Legislative misalignment may arise when multiple district-specific
misalignments are aggregated. For example, if a third party plays spoiler to
the same major party in several districts, then it is possible that the major
party will be denied a legislative majority even if it is preferred by the
jurisdiction’s median voter. On the other hand, multiple district-specific
misalignments also may cancel out and thus lead to legislative alignment.
For instance, even if most representatives hold more extreme policy views
than their constituents, the median member of the legislature might be a
moderate whose opinions are congruent with those of the jurisdiction’s
median voter. Furthermore, legislative misalignment is possible even in the
absence of district-specific misalignment. In particular, gerrymandering
typically does not affect preference congruence within districts, but it often
prevents the party preferred by most voters in a jurisdiction from winning a
legislative majority.100 The relationships between district-specific and
legislative misalignment, and between partisan and policy misalignment, are
depicted in Figure 4. As noted earlier, partisan misalignment leads almost
inevitably to policy misalignment,101 while district-specific misalignments
may or may not aggregate into legislative misalignment.

and aggregate preferences at the congressional chamber level”); Gerber & Morton, supra note 93, at 30506.
100
See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislatures, Initiatives, and Representation, 49 POL. RES. Q. 263, 265
(1996).
101
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 4: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TYPES OF MISALIGNMENT

While only partisan and policy alignment are possible at the district
level, another kind of alignment could be pursued at the legislative level:
congruence between the median voter’s policy preferences and the actual
policies enacted by the government. In other words, perhaps the policies
preferred by the median voter should be passed, not just supported by the
median representative. I am sympathetic to this argument, and in fact several
studies have evaluated democratic systems by examining how closely voters’
policy views correspond to policy outcomes.102 However, policy outcome
alignment (as opposed to policy preference alignment) probably is too
ambitious a goal for election law to achieve. The laws that a government
enacts are the product of not only politicians’ policy preferences, but also the
relationship between the executive and legislative branches, legislative
structures and voting rules, lobbying efforts, and many other factors that are
beyond the domain of election law.103 If elections are organized so that they
make policy preference alignment more probable—which in turn may

102
See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY 245 (1993); Lax & Phillips,
supra note 70, at 152-57; John G. Matsusaka, Popular Control of Public Policy, 5 Q.J. POL. SCI. 133, 14244 (2010).
103
I discuss some of these non-legal determinants of policy outcome misalignment in Section IV.B,
infra.
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improve the odds of policy outcome alignment too—then they are doing all
that reasonably can be expected of them.
A few final points about this conceptual framework may help resolve any
lingering confusion.
First, the reason why the median voter and
representative are so important is that only they belong by definition to a
popular or legislative majority. Any position other than the median in a
distribution along a single axis may be outvoted by another position that is
closer to the median.104 Second, while it is possible in theory to compare
voter and legislator distributions in their entirety, such comparisons require
additional data, address issues other than whether the majority’s preferences
are realized, and hence are conducted very rarely. According to Matt Golder
and Jacek Stramski, “To our knowledge, there is no research on
representation that explicitly conceptualizes ideological congruence as a
many-to-many relationship.”105
Third, the preferences of voters and representatives are not fixed, but
rather vary as they hear new arguments, receive more information, or
undergo changes in their circumstances.106 The point of the alignment
approach is that their preferences should correspond after this dynamic
process has unfolded, not before. Fourth, the approach applies with equal
force to both courts and policymakers. Courts should take alignment into
account when deciding election law cases, while policymakers should
consider it when designing democratic institutions. Lastly, alignment is not
quite the same thing as raw majoritarianism. Majoritarianism usually implies
that a majority can get whatever it wants—that the median position of the
majority inevitably is enacted. But under the alignment approach it is not the
majority’s median that matters but rather that of the distribution as a whole.
True, the overall median is necessarily supported by a majority, but it is still
distinct from (and more moderate than) the median of the majority alone.107

104
See, e.g., MICHAEL D. MCDONALD & IAN BUDGE, ELECTIONS, PARTIES, DEMOCRACY 26 (2005);
Huber & Powell, supra note 89, at 293 (“On a single issue or a single-issue dimension . . . the position of
the median voter is the only policy that is preferred to all others by a majority of voters.”). And the reason
why the median voter is so important (as opposed to the median donor or the median volunteer) is that, in
a democracy, voting is the mechanism by which people ultimately determine who will have the privilege
of governing them.
105
Golder & Stramski, supra note 89, at 95-96; see also Hee-Min Kim & Richard C. Fording,
Extending Party Estimates to Governments and Electors, in MAPPING POLICY PREFERENCES 1945-1998,
at 157, 159 (Ian Budge et al. eds., 2001) (noting that often “it is not feasible to describe the exact shape of
the voter distribution on an ideological dimension”). In particular, a comparison of voter and legislator
distributions in their entirety would indicate how accurately all voter preferences, not just those held by a
majority, are reflected in the legislature. Such accurate reflection is the fundamental goal of proportional
representation systems, but it is at most a secondary aim of U.S.-style plurality voting regimes.
106
See Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 3, 10 (1991).
107
See MARTY COHEN ET AL., THE PARTY DECIDES 25 (2008) (distinguishing between “the median
position of the majority party” and “the median of the legislature as a whole”); Ansolabehere et al., supra
note 66, at 560 (same).
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B. Intellectual Origins
Interestingly, no particular thinker is associated with the normative
argument that voters’ and representatives’ preferences should be aligned.
The economist Anthony Downs famously explained why candidates and
parties converge on the median voter under certain conditions,108 and a large
political science literature has sought to measure the extent of this
convergence.109 But neither Downs nor his empirically minded successors
have set forth a normative account of why alignment is desirable. Instead,
they typically have assumed its desirability before embarking on elaborate
investigations of whether it in fact is being achieved.110
In the democratic theory literature, on the other hand, normative
analyses abound, and scholars from several different schools have portrayed
alignment as an appealing democratic principle. I do not purport to exhaust
this literature in the brief discussion that follows. My aim, rather, is to show
that even though no theory of democracy makes alignment its centerpiece,
several prominent accounts treat it as an important value that any polity
should hope to realize. Alignment has at least as distinguished an intellectual
pedigree as structural values such as competition and participation.111
First, in the Madisonian theory that underpins the American
constitutional system, it was thought vital that members of the House of
Representatives (though not necessarily other politicians) share the views and
values of their constituents. Madison wrote that “it is particularly essential
that [the House] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate
sympathy with, the people.”112 He added that “[f]requent elections are
unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can
be effectually secured.”113 Recurring elections motivate House members to
stay faithful to their constituents’ positions—and enable their punishment at
the polls if they stray too far.
Second, for scholars of representation, one of the classic conceptions of
the representative is the delegate model. A delegate “must do what his
principal would do, must act as if the principal himself were acting . . . . must
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See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114-27 (1957).
For just a taste, see the sources cited above in notes 66, 89, and 93.
110
See Andrew Rehfield, Representation Rethought, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214, 219 (2009);
Andrew Sabl, Does “Democracy” Mean that Outcomes Should Track Voter Preferences? 4 (Sept. 1,
2012) (noting that “many political scientists . . . assume . . . something like the correspondence theory”).
Two studies that include more extended theoretical discussions of alignment before commencing their
empirical analyses are MCDONALD & BUDGE, supra note 104, and POWELL, supra note 89.
111
See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing competition and participation).
112
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison)
(“[T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of
their dependence on the people.”).
113
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison); see also BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 162-63 (1997) (arguing that in Madisonian theory “[a] link of some sort
was thus posited or presupposed between the preferences of the people and the decisions of their
representatives”).
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vote as a majority of his constituents would,” as Pitkin put it in her landmark
work.114 In other words, a delegate must align his own preferences with
those of his constituents. He must not deviate from his constituents’ views
even if he is urged to do so by his party or personal ideology.
Third, the minimalist theory of democracy views a rough form of
alignment as one of the only functions of elections. Minimalists understand
campaigns to be struggles between competing elites, and they expect the
electorate to do nothing more than choose between candidates on the basis of
their records and promises. A plausible outcome of this process, in which
candidates usually prevail when their stances are shared by the electorate and
vice versa, is the congruence of voters’ and representatives’ positions.
According to Posner, “The essence of [minimalist] democracy . . . is that the
interests (preferences, values, opinions) of the population . . . be represented
in government.”115
Fourth, pluralists see elections as opportunities for groups of all stripes to
pursue their respective interests and influence the policymaking process.
Elections play this role because, after winning office, representatives have a
strong incentive to support the positions of the groups that helped elect them.
In Robert Dahl’s words, elections “vastly increase the size, number, and
variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken into account by
leaders in making policy choices.”116 The minorities whose views are
considered may not accurately reflect the public at any given moment, but
they should mirror the electorate over the long run (or at least that is the
pluralist hope).
Fifth, for participatory democrats, one of the normative rationales for
mass participation is that it raises the salience of the public’s preferences and
makes it more likely that they will be respected. Representatives should find
it more difficult to ignore voters’ opinions when their legitimacy has been
enhanced through intensive involvement. As David Held has written, “If
people know opportunities exist for effective participation in decisionmaking, they are likely to . . . hold that collective decisions should be
binding.”117 An engaged public is more apt than an apathetic one to insist on
alignment.
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PITKIN, supra note 11, at 144-45; see also, e.g., Donald J. McCrone & James H. Kuklinski, The
Delegate Theory of Representation, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 278, 278 (1979) (“The delegate theory of
representation . . . posits that the representative ought to reflect purposively the preferences of his
constituents.”).
115
POSNER, supra note 33, at 165; see also, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 269, 273 (2nd ed. 1947) (defining democracy as “a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote” and arguing that this definition “assure[s] the standing of the majority system within the
logic of the democratic method”).
116
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRACY THEORY 132 (1956); see also, e.g., DAVID
TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 318 (2d ed. 1971) (“A group that can point to activities
suggesting a contribution to the election results is not likely to be turned away by a recently elected
official.”).
117
HELD, supra note 84, at 212; see also, e.g., BENJAMIN A. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 151
(1984); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 132 (2000) (“Without . . . citizen
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Finally, the deliberative theory of democracy does not value deliberation
for its own sake, but rather because it refines voter preferences that then
ought to be converted into policy. Deliberation is only worthwhile if the
outcome of all the reasoned dialogue eventually is enacted into law.
According to Joshua Cohen, “The point of deliberative democracy is not for
people to reflect on their preferences, but to decide, in light of reasons, what
to do.”118 The point, in other words, is for deliberation to reshape voters’
views, and in turn to reshape representatives’ positions and actions.
To be sure, there are accounts of democracy that do not place much
weight on alignment. For example, the other classic conception of the
representative is the trustee model. Trustees are supposed to exercise their
own independent judgment when deciding how to act in the legislature, not
to abide by the preferences of their constituents.119 Similarly, Madison may
have wanted House members to be tied closely to the people, but he also
believed that popular opinions should be “refine[d] and enlarge[d] . . . by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country.”120 Later in this
Part I discuss the normative appeal of theories that cast representatives as
statesmen who should pursue the public interest as they perceive it.121 But
here the point must be conceded that scholars do not all agree about the
importance of alignment in a democracy. There may be an overlapping
consensus on this issue, but there plainly is not unanimity.
C. Doctrinal Hints
In the Supreme Court’s case law, there is not even an overlapping
consensus—nothing close to it, in fact. As discussed earlier, the Court’s
typical approach in election law cases is to identify any rights that have been
burdened by electoral regulations and then to weigh the burdens against the
interests served by the regulations. This methodology pays no heed to the
congruence of voters’ and representatives’ preferences.122 Nevertheless, the
idea that such congruence is desirable has made repeated appearances in
certain Justices’ opinions, in contexts including party regulation, campaign

participation, the connection between the representative and constituents is most likely to be broken . . .
.”).
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Joshua Cohen, Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY
219, 222 (Shawn W. Rosenberg ed., 2007); see also, e.g., BESSETTE, supra note 12, at 36; AMY GUTMANN
& DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 130 (1996) (“[I]n a deliberative democracy
constituents should be able to give effect to their views . . . by influencing the judgments that their
representatives make in the legislative process.”).
119
See PITKIN, supra note 11, at 127; Rehfield, supra note 110, at 215.
120
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander
Hamilton) (“The republican principle . . . does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden
breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive . . . .”); James A. Gardner,
Madison’s Hope, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 129-30 (2000).
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See infra Section II.D.
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finance, and redistricting.123 At least occasionally, some Justices do seem to
think that voters’ partisan and policy positions should be shared by their
elected leaders. Alignment therefore is not alien to the law, and it easily
could be made a more significant factor in the doctrine if a majority of the
Court were persuaded of its value.124
Beginning with the party regulation context, alignment has manifested
itself in both its partisan and policy guises. First, with respect to partisan
alignment, several Justices have defended laws that limit the ability of third
parties to secure places on the ballot on the ground that they make it more
likely that candidates preferred by majorities of voters will be elected. In a
1968 case involving Ohio’s rules for qualifying for the ballot, Justice Stewart
worried that third party contestation could cause elections to be won by
“candidates who gain a plurality but who are, vis-à-vis their principal
opponents, preferred by less than half of those voting.”125 He added that “the
State’s interest in attempting to ensure that a minority of voters do not thwart
the will of the majority is a legitimate one”126—a view that Justice Harlan
endorsed as well.127 Likewise, in a 1972 case involving Texas’s ballot access
requirements, the Court declared that “the State understandably and properly
seeks to . . . assure that the winner is the choice of a majority.”128 The Court
then referred approvingly to a provision requiring a runoff election if no
candidate received a majority in the first round.129
Second, with respect to policy alignment, a number of Justices have
expressed support for primaries that are open to voters who are not party
members, reasoning that they are more likely to produce nominees whose
views correspond (and appeal) to the median general election voter. In a
1981 case, Justice Powell argued that, “[b]y attracting participation by
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Alignment also has made more limited appearances in two other election law contexts: franchise
restriction and minority representation. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 19 (2009) (defending
Court’s holding that minority group must constitute majority of proposed district’s population in order to
prevail under section 2 of Voting Rights Act by invoking “special significance, in the democratic process,
of a majority”); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (striking down ban on voting by members of
military in part because “‘[f]encing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way
they may vote is constitutionally impermissible”).
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I do not claim that the alignment approach is constitutionally compelled, but it is worth noting
here that several modalities of constitutional argument do support it. This Section sets forth the doctrinal
case for the approach. Arguments based on text (particularly the Republican Guarantee Clause), history
(particularly the Madisonian conception of the House), democratic theory, and prudential consequences
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Id. at 56.
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burden on third parties’ participational rights. See id. at 32.
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Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
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See id. However, in the case’s principal holding, the Court struck down high filing fees that
prevented some candidates from running in primary elections. See id. at 145-49.
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relatively independent-minded voters,” Wisconsin’s open primary “may
enlarge the support for a party at the general election.”130 Similarly, in a
1986 case, the Court held that the open primary sought by Connecticut’s
Republican Party would help it determine “how . . . most effectively [to]
appeal to the independent voter.”131 “By inviting independents to assist in
the choice at the polls . . . the Party rule is intended to produce the candidate
and platform most likely to achieve that goal.”132 And in a 2000 case, Justice
Stevens contended that California’s interest in increasing the
“representativeness” of its elected officials was compelling—and thus that
the state’s innovative blanket primary should have been upheld.133
Policy alignment also has been an occasional concern of the Court’s in
the campaign finance context. Here the Justices have worried that large
contributions might induce politicians to adopt the views of their donors
rather than of their constituents. In a 1985 case, Justice White argued in
favor of a restriction on spending by outside groups because “[t]he candidate
may be forced to please the spenders rather than the voters, and the two
groups are not identical.”134 Likewise, in a 2000 case, the Court used the
vocabulary of alignment to define the state interest that was advanced by a
Missouri contribution limit. “[W]e recognize[] . . . the broader threat from
politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”135 And in its
historic 2003 decision upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, the
Court affirmed the state’s alignment interest in still more striking terms.
“Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo
corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the
merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of
those who have made large financial contributions valued by the
officeholder.”136
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Lastly, in the redistricting domain, fears about misalignment at the
legislative level have motivated several of the Court’s most important
interventions. The Court imposed the one-person, one-vote rule in the 1960s
in part because of its view that “in a society ostensibly grounded on
representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the
people of a State could elect a majority of that State’s legislators.”137 Prior to
the rule’s imposition, rural minorities in many states had been able to control
majorities in the states’ legislatures and congressional delegations. Similarly,
a recurrent theme in the Court’s gerrymandering doctrine is that a partisan
minority also should not command a legislative majority. In the 1986 case
that first recognized a cause of action for gerrymandering, the plurality stated
that “evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters”
is necessary to establish a constitutional violation.138 In a 2004 case, Justice
Breyer sharply criticized “situation[s] in which a party that enjoys only
minority support among the populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and
hold, legislative power.”139 And in the Court’s most recent gerrymandering
decision, Justice Stevens devoted much of his dissent to statistics showing
that if Texas’s Democrats had won a majority of the statewide vote, they
would have won only twelve of the state’s thirty-two congressional seats.140
It is true that these references to alignment are rare snippets in a body of
doctrine that is far more interested in rights-and-interests balancing than in
preference congruence. The point of this discussion certainly is not that the
Court somehow has adopted the alignment approach sub silentio. Rather, the
claim is that the case law contains tantalizing hints that the approach may
appeal to the Court—at least to certain Justices in certain kinds of cases—
and may offer a workable framework for resolving election law disputes.
The doctrinal roots of alignment plainly are shallow. But its doctrinal future
may still be bright.
D. Democratic Appeal
Alignment is not only promising because it enjoys support in the
democratic theory literature and in the case law. It also could serve as a
unifying election law principle because it is normatively attractive—because

137
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). Even some of the dissenters in the great oneperson, one-vote cases embraced the alignment principle. See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly
of State of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 753-54 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [district] plan must be such
as not to permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the State.”).
138
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (plurality opinion). In her concurrence, Justice
O’Connor oddly equated partisan alignment with proportional representation, which she argued “is in
serious tension with essential features of state legislative elections.” Id. at 159 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment).
139
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Like Justice O’Connor in
Bandemer, the plurality in Vieth claimed that partisan alignment is equivalent to proportional
representation—and judicially unworkable to boot. See id. at 287-89 (plurality opinion).
140
See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 466-67 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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it flows directly from the core meaning of democracy. Below I describe the
democratic provenance of the principle. I then explain why other key
democratic values are realized as well in a properly aligned political system.
Lastly, I argue that the appeal of alignment is not undercut by trustee theories
of representation that downplay the relevance of popular preferences.
The most basic definition of democracy is a government (kratos) of the
people (demos).141 A polity is democratic if the people are sovereign, if their
will is acknowledged and, ultimately, heeded by their elected representatives.
This is not the idiosyncratic view of a particular camp. It is, rather, “a
minimal core conception, one on which a number of more specific theories
converge,” according to Bernard Manin.142 The notion of “congruence
between the preferences of citizens and the actions of policymakers . . . . is
not a unique position but rather . . . a common assumption of those who
theorize about liberal democracy,” in the words of John Huber and G.
Bingham Powell.143
As the second quote reveals, the alignment approach is so closely related
to the essence of democracy that to state the latter is almost to articulate the
former. If it is the people who are sovereign, then it is their preferences, as to
both party and policy, that should be followed. If it is the people who rule,
then it is their preferences that should be reflected in the positions of their
representatives, and, ideally, in the laws that their government enacts. And
since not all of the people’s preferences can be followed, it is the view of the
majority (embodied by the median voter) that should be heeded when there is
disagreement. Analogously, in the legislature, it is the pivotal (typically the
median) legislator who should be aligned with the median voter, so that the
weight of public opinion corresponds to the fulcrum of legislative power.
Median-median alignment of this sort increases the likelihood that the
people’s preferences will be realized. It increases the likelihood, in other
words, that a polity genuinely will be democratic.144
The democratic appeal of the alignment approach also is evident from
the sense of injustice that is provoked by cases of misalignment. Suppose
that a majority of voters wish to be represented (or governed) by Party A, but
instead it is Party B that holds the reins of power. Hamilton deemed this
situation a “poison” in the Federalist, because it “subject[s] the sense of the
greater number to that of the lesser.”145 The unfairness is comparable when it
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See GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 21 (1987).
Bernard Manin et al., Introduction, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 1,
2 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999).
143
Huber & Powell, supra note 89, at 292; see also Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 526 (2003) (arguing that “constituent-representative congruence . . . . is a factor
in each of the forms of representation”); Sunstein, supra note 106, at 6 (“Should a constitutional
democracy take preferences as the basis for political choice? In contemporary politics, law, and
economics, the usual answer is affirmative.”).
144
See POWELL, supra note 89, at 16 (arguing that if “congruence between voters and policymakers
is very strong, then elections seem to be performing well as instruments of democracy”).
145
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
142
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is a non-partisan majority preference—a preference as to general ideology or
specific policy—that is frustrated. If the majority favors conservative
representation and a minority backs liberalism, why should it be the latter
position that prevails? If the majority wants stricter gun control laws and a
minority does not, why should elected officials privilege the view of the
smaller group?146 None of this is to say that the will of the majority should
triumph even in areas that the Constitution has declared off-limits to ordinary
politics.147 But it is to say that it is troubling when the majority operates
within constitutional constraints but nevertheless is thwarted by a minority.
Majorities should not be losers in a democracy, at least not too often, or else
the polity’s very claim to be a democracy may start to be called into
question.148
Beyond its connection to the core meaning of democracy, the alignment
approach is attractive because it promotes the achievement of key democratic
goals such as accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy. (These, of
course, are precisely the goals that advocates of competition and participation
hope to attain.149) With respect to accountability, the approach provides a
valuable benchmark by which the performance of elected officials can be
assessed. Officials can be ousted from office when their records are
incongruent with the preferences of their constituents, and reelected when
their records are congruent.150 Similarly, with respect to responsiveness, a
properly aligned political system necessarily is responsive to changes in
public opinion. If voters’ and politicians’ positions correspond both before
and after shifts in opinion occur, then politicians must be responding with
alacrity to swings in the mood of the electorate. As for legitimacy, it is hard
to see what could be more appropriate in a democracy than representation

146
One possible answer is that the minority’s preferences are more intense, and thus that aggregate
utility will increase if they are satisfied. But in a democracy that is committed to the political equality of
all citizens, it is difficult to justify the unequal weighting of people’s preferences. In theory if not in fact,
everyone is supposed to be equal when votes are cast and public policies are enacted. See SARTORI, supra
note 141, at 227 (noting that “the majority principle” embraced by democracies “disregards the unequal
intensity of individual preferences”); see also POWELL, supra note 89, at 167 (finding that people’s mean
preferences, which take intensity into account, do not vary appreciably from their median preferences,
which do not).
147
See ELAINE SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 109 (1984) (“Majority sovereignty says nothing about which
substantive decisions . . . are within the majority’s purview.”).
148
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring to “the fundamental maxim of
republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail”); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 58 (James Madison) (referring to “the fundamental principle of free government” that “the majority . .
. would rule”).
149
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
150
See Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, Out of Office, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127, 133
(2002) (finding that “an incumbent receives a significantly lower electoral margin the more he votes with
the extreme of his party”); Shor, supra note 73, at 38. Of course, voters may well want to hold
representatives accountable for more than their voting records. Constituent service, seniority, good
character, and many other factors also may play into voters’ decisions.
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(and, ideally, public policy) that accurately reflects the views of the people.
Legitimacy stems directly from alignment.151
It bears repeating here that my argument is only that alignment is
democratically appealing, not that it is the most appealing democratic
principle. Later in the Article I discuss the plurality of election law values
and offer some tentative thoughts as to which values are most salient in
which contexts.152 It also is true that at least one prominent family of
democratic theories—those that conceive of representatives as trustees who
pursue the public interest as they see it—places little weight on alignment.
The whole point of a trustee is that she does what she thinks is in the best
interest of her constituency, not what her constituents want her to do.153 Do
these trustee theories undermine the normative case for the alignment
approach? They do not, in my view, for three reasons.
First, there often may be no difference between what an elected official
thinks is in the best interest of her constituency and what her constituents
want her to do. In this case—which scholars of representation regard as the
norm154—trustee theories and the alignment approach point in the same
direction. Second, when the policy assessments of a politician and of the
electorate do diverge, it is by no means clear that the politician’s judgment is
superior. The politician may be corrupt or ignorant or motivated by an
ideology that the public does not share, and even a fair-minded expert
frequently is less accurate than an aggregation of many laypeople.155 Lastly,
there is abundant empirical evidence that, at least in contemporary American
politics, representatives very rarely behave as trustees. Representatives often
respond to the policy preferences of their constituents, and they almost
always respond to the demands of their political party. But the quantum of
legislative behavior that cannot be explained by these factors (and that could
be attributable to impartial analysis of the public interest) is very small. 156
Accordingly, even if trustee theories are theoretically alluring, their practical
applicability to modern politics is highly limited.157

151
See SARTORI, supra note 141, at 135 (arguing that “the majority principle . . . adds an element of
legitimacy” to public policy).
152
See infra Section IV.A.
153
See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
154
See, e.g., PITKIN, supra note 11, at 165 (“Normally, the conflict between what [the representative]
thinks best (for them) and what they want (as best for themselves) simply should not arise.”).
155
See generally CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA (2006).
156
See, e.g., MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 95, at 37-41 (showing that constituency and party
variables explain 77% to 90% of variation in House members’ voting records over the last four decades);
Elisabeth R. Gerber & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Beyond the Median, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1364, 1375 (2004) (same
variables explain over 90% of variation in California legislators’ voting records in 1990s); Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 162-63 (2013) (using empirical
evidence to argue for inapplicability of trustee theories to redistricting context).
157
Another argument against trustee theories is that they are too elitist for the more populist modern
conception of democracy. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE 62 (1995) (arguing that
“[t]he elite democracy of the Framers . . . has given way in successive battles and innovations to . . . . mass
democracy”).
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The alignment approach, then, calls for the congruence of voters’ and
representatives’ preferences, with respect to both party and policy, at the
levels of both the individual district and the entire jurisdiction. The approach
is supported by an overlapping consensus in the democratic theory literature
as well as by occasional references in the case law. And the approach is
normatively attractive because it derives from the basic definition of
democracy itself. In the next Part I show how the approach could be used to
reframe election law disputes in a variety of areas. I show, that is, how
election law might look through the prism of alignment.
III. ALIGNMENT AND ELECTION LAW
Election law would look quite different indeed through the alignment
prism. In field after field, the attention of courts and scholars would be
directed to how closely voters’ and representatives’ preferences
correspond—not to rights-and-interests balancing or to structural
considerations such as competition and participation. Election law would be
focused on one of the most crucial values that elections are meant to realize.
Below I explore how the alignment approach could be applied to five
distinct election law contexts: franchise restriction, party regulation,
campaign finance, redistricting, and minority representation. With each
context, I start by summarizing the prevailing judicial and academic accounts
of the harms that may arise and the ways that they may be alleviated. I then
explain how the relevant injuries might helpfully be reconceived under the
alignment approach. Next I offer sketches of how courts could use the
approach to uphold aligning policies and strike down misaligning ones.
Lastly, I draw on the political science literature to estimate the current level
of misalignment in each area. The level is high and growing higher—
meaning that the need for a theory that advocates alignment has never been
more urgent.
A. Franchise Restriction
I begin my election law survey with franchise restrictions: measures that
make it more difficult for otherwise eligible individuals to vote.158 In earlier
periods, these restrictions included property ownership requirements, pauper
exclusions, poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses.159 They

158
The line between franchise restrictions and eligibility requirements for voting is not always very
clear. The alignment approach also could be applied to eligibility requirements—many of which likely
would survive review, even if they have misaligning effects, because they serve important state interests
such as defining the normative electorate.
159
For a comprehensive list of these earlier restrictions, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE 306-68 (2000).

37

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

typically aimed to (and did) prevent members of disfavored groups such as
immigrants, the poor, and African Americans from participating in
elections.160 In recent years, many new restrictions have been enacted around
the country. In 2011 and 2012 alone, nineteen states adopted photo ID
requirements for voting, proof-of-citizenship requirements for registering to
vote, limits on voter registration drives, cutbacks to early voting, or stricter
felon disenfranchisement laws.161 This burst of activity constitutes the most
significant retrenchment in the public’s access to the polls since the end of
the Civil Rights era.
When franchise restrictions are challenged in litigation, courts weigh the
limitation on the right to vote against the state interests served by the
restrictions (improving election administration, preventing fraud, and the
like).162 Courts thus conceptualize the injury that is inflicted as an
encumbrance on an individual right, which is to be tolerated only if the
resulting cost is outweighed by the benefits that accrue when the state’s
interests are advanced. Some of the legal literature endorses this sort of
rights-and-interests balancing.163 Other scholars argue that the key harm
caused by franchise restrictions is a decline in competition. A decline
occurs, on this view, when a party seeks to entrench itself in office by
preventing its opponent’s supporters from voting. 164 Still other scholars
regard the harm of these restrictions as mostly participational. Voter turnout
is vital in a democracy, but it declines when barriers to casting ballots are
high.165
Under the alignment approach, in contrast, the injury perpetrated by
franchise restrictions is the potential divergence between the median actual
voter and the median eligible voter who would have gone to the polls in the
absence of the restrictions. The partisan preference of the median actual
voter necessarily is dispositive in a two-party race, and her policy
preferences exert a substantial influence too on the positions taken by her
representative.166 But in a democracy committed to the principle that all
people who are entitled to vote should be able to do so if they so desire,167 the
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See id. at 91 (noting that “late-nineteenth-century effort to transform the South’s electorate was
grounded solidly in class concerns as well as racial antagonism”); id. at 104, 111 (describing class-based
and anti-immigrant rationales for franchise restrictions in North); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS 7 (1974).
161
See BRENNAN CTR. UPDATE, supra note 1, at 1-6, 17-21.
162
See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (setting forth standard that strict scrutiny
applies when franchise restrictions are “severe,” but that “‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’”
should be upheld if they serve “‘the State’s important regulatory interests’” (quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983))); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
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See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 39, at 97; Fishkin, supra note 42, at 1292.
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See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 652-74; Klarman, supra note 49, at 535-36.
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See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 675; Overton, supra note 51, at 673.
166
See John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented?, 67 J. POL. 1206, 1207-09
(2005) (finding that representatives are far more responsive to voters than to nonvoters).
167
See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“[A] citizen has a constitutionally
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”);
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median actual voter is a less compelling figure than the median eligible voter
who wishes to participate in an election. A gap between these two
individuals emerges whenever franchise restrictions distort the partisan or
ideological composition of the electorate. A gap emerges, that is, whenever
the restrictions impose different voting burdens on different political groups.
In this Article’s terminology, partisan misalignment at the district level is
the most obvious harm that may occur as a consequence of measures that
make it more difficult to vote. This kind of noncongruence arises if the
partisan preference of the median actual voter differs from that of the median
eligible voter who would have participated had the measures not been
enacted. For example, the median actual voter might be a Republican, but
the median eligible voter who would have turned out had there not been, say,
a photo ID requirement might be a Democrat. Another harm that franchise
restrictions may cause, even if there is no partisan mismatch, is policy
misalignment at the district level. This sort of noncongruence develops if a
representative adopts the views of the median actual voter and if these views
are not shared by the median eligible voter who would have liked to
participate. For instance, the median actual voter might be highly
conservative, but the median eligible voter who would have turned out had
there not been, say, a proof-of-citizenship requirement might be relatively
moderate.168
It is worth noting here that many franchise restrictions aim to prevent
voter fraud,169 and that fraud itself may result in misalignment. If enough
fraudulent votes are cast to change an election’s outcome, then a clear
disjunction emerges between the median lawful ballot and the median ballot
that actually is counted.170 However, levels of fraud have been found to be
very low in recent American elections.171 The misalignment that might be
caused by fraud therefore pales in comparison to the misalignment that is

Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (extolling “right of qualified voters, regardless of their
political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively”). Of course, the participatory principle is not absolute.
Some franchise restrictions—for instance, set hours for polling places—are necessary in order to conduct
elections in the first place. Restrictions essential to the basic operation of the electoral system should be
upheld even if they happen to have misaligning effects. The misaligning effects are outweighed in such
cases by the compelling interests served by the restrictions. Moreover, the participatory principle also
plainly stems from a democratic value other than alignment itself. As noted earlier, the alignment
principle does not help in selecting the normatively significant person whose preferences should be
satisfied. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
168
These district-level misalignments, if they occur in multiple constituencies, may aggregate into
partisan or policy misalignment at the legislative level too.
169
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194-97 (2008) (discussing antifraud interest asserted by Indiana in case involving photo ID requirement).
170
See Fishkin, supra note 42, at 1307 (“The first and most obvious reason to prevent fraudulent
votes is that they might alter an election outcome . . . .”).
171
See LORRAINE C. MINNITE & DAVID CALLAHAN, SECURING THE VOTE 6 (2003) (finding that
“incidence of election fraud is minimal” between 1992 and 2002); Natasha Khan & Corbin Carson,
Comprehensive Database of U.S. Voter Fraud Uncovers No Evidence That Photo ID Is Needed, NEWS21
(Aug. 12, 2012), http://votingrights.news21.com/article/election-fraud/ (finding “infinitesimal” rate of
voter fraud since 2000).
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produced by measures that make it more difficult to vote. This is an area in
which the cure is worse than the ailment.
How, then, should courts tackle cases involving franchise restrictions
under the alignment approach? My goal in this Article is not to make
detailed doctrinal recommendations, but the crucial point is that courts
should seek out—and then focus on—evidence about the misalignment that
is likely to result from the measures at issue. If the measures probably will
impose similar voting burdens on different political groups, then they
probably should be upheld.172 But if the odds are high that they will affect
some groups (minorities, the poor, the young) more than others (whites, the
affluent, the middle-aged), then they should be regarded with significant
skepticism. All of the genres of misalignment are more likely to materialize
in this case, and such risks should be accepted only if the interests asserted
by the state are highly compelling. The alignment approach therefore might
take the form not of rights-and-interests balancing but rather of congruenceand-interests balancing. The greater the danger of misalignment, the stronger
the state’s interests would need to be to sustain the relevant measures (and
the tighter the measures’ tailoring), and vice versa.173
The political science literature sheds light on how great the danger of
misalignment actually is with different kinds of franchise restrictions. First,
the most common restrictions in the Jim Crow South, poll taxes and literacy
tests, disproportionately reduced the turnout of African Americans and poor
whites, thus strengthening the electoral position of the then-dominant
Democratic Party. According to one analysis, the poll tax increased the
Democratic share of seats in southern state legislatures by about 3%, and the
literacy test by about 8%.174 Second, the partisan impact of the most
controversial modern restrictions, photo ID requirements for voting, is still
hotly debated. Surveys of eligible voters typically find substantial
differences in the possession of valid IDs between Democratic- and
Republican-leaning constituencies.175 However, studies that examine actual
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More precisely, such measures should not be invalidated on an alignment theory, but could still
be struck down because of their infringements of individual rights. See infra Section IV.A (discussing
plurality of election law values).
173
For example, photo ID requirements would be unlikely to be upheld under the alignment
approach because they produce moderate levels of misalignment, see infra notes 175-177, without
preventing a substantial amount of voter fraud, see Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,
194 (2008) (conceding that there was “no evidence” of voter impersonation fraud ever taking place in
state). I should also note that my earlier criticisms of the Court’s rights-and-interests framework, see
supra Part I, were directed at the exclusion of alignment from the Court’s balancing analysis, not at
balancing per se. I see nothing objectionable about balancing as long as the right factors are being
balanced.
174
See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 7,
27 (2003); see also KEYSSAR, supra note 159, at 85, 91, 138; KOUSSER, supra note 160, at 240 (noting that
in Jim Crow South “there were massive declines in turnout and opposition party strength after suffrage
restriction[s]” were enacted).
175
See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF 3 (2006) (eligible minority
voters are 8% to 17% less likely than eligible white voters to possess valid IDs); Matt A. Barretto et al.,
The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana,
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election results usually conclude that photo ID laws have smaller effects.176
The best estimates are that such laws reduce overall turnout by 2-3% and
produce a pro-Republican swing of 1-2%.177
Third, other common modern restrictions seem to have widely divergent
partisan consequences. One study determined that early closing dates for
voter registration and purges of voter rolls cause significant declines in
turnout but do not alter the partisan composition of the electorate.178 In
contrast, two other studies found that the elimination of election day
registration both reduces turnout and results in a pro-Republican swing of
about 5%.179 And a study of felon disenfranchisement laws concluded that
the people they prevent from voting lean Democratic by a two-to-one
margin, and that at least seven recent Senate elections would have had
different outcomes had ex-felons been able to vote.180 Lastly, there is
evidence that elected officials’ voting records are more consistent with the
policy preferences of voters than with those of nonvoters.181 Since voters and
nonvoters tend to have different preferences,182 policies that deter eligible
individuals from going to the polls are likely to produce policy misalignment.
Unfortunately, the political science literature rarely has linked the
partisan swings caused by franchise restrictions to the views of the median
eligible voter, and the work on the policy misalignment generated by these
measures remains in its infancy. Still, there is little doubt that the
misaligning effects of voting rules can be quantified and then presented in a
usable format to courts. There also is little doubt that these effects vary
widely from case to case, but at least sometimes are large enough to wreak

42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 111, 114 (2009) (gap of 4.5% between registered Democrats and Republicans in
Indiana); Charles Stewart III, Voter ID 22 (Apr. 4, 2013) (gap of 2% to 3% between registered Democrats
and Republicans nationwide).
176
See, e.g., R. Michael Alvarez et al., The Effect of Voter Identification Laws on Turnout 3 (VTP
Working Paper #57, Oct. 2007); Brad T. Gomez, Uneven Hurdles 19 (April 2008) (finding “slight”
increase in Republican vote share in states with photo ID laws); Timothy Vercellotti & David Andersen,
Protecting the Franchise, or Restricting It? The Effects of Voter Identification Requirements on Turnout
11 (Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 2006) (finding 2.9% decline in turnout in states with ID requirements).
177
See id.; see also Nate Cohn, Finally, Real Numbers on Voter ID, NEW REPUBLIC (July 22, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113986/voter-id-north-carolina-law-hurts-democrats (estimating proRepublican swing of about 0.6% if North Carolina enacts photo ID law); Nate Silver, Measuring the
Effects of Voter Identification Laws, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 15, 2012), http://fivethirtyeight.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/measuring-the-effects-of-voter-identification-laws/ (switch from no photo
ID law to strict photo ID law reduces turnout by about 2.4% and causes pro-Republican swing of about
1.2%).
178
See Glenn E. Mitchell & Christopher Wlezien, The Impact of Legal Constraints on Voter
Registration, Turnout, and the Composition of the American Electorate, 17 POL. BEHAVIOR 179, 186, 195
(1995).
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See Besley & Case, supra note 174, at 27; Barry C. Burden et al., Election Laws and Partisan
Gains 8 (2013) (also finding that elimination of early voting results in pro-Democratic swing of about
5%).
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See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 777, 786-87 (2002).
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See Griffin & Newman, supra note 166, at 1207-09.
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See id. at 1214 (voters generally are more conservative than nonvoters); see also Jack Citrin et al.,
What if Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of Increased Turnout in Senate Elections, 47 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 75, 81 (2003) (voters generally are more Republican than nonvoters).
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serious democratic damage. Accordingly, no empirical obstacle exists to the
adoption of the alignment approach in the franchise restriction context, and
in fact abundant empirical evidence indicates that the ill it seeks to combat is
substantial. Misalignment is not mere conjecture in this domain, but rather
well-documented reality.
B. Party Regulation
I next consider regulations of political parties, two kinds of which often
result in litigation. First, all states impose ballot access requirements with
which parties must comply in order to secure places on the general election
ballot. They include laws that certain numbers of signatures be gathered,
filing deadlines for the completion of the signature-gathering process, and
“sore loser” provisions that bar candidates defeated in primaries from
running again in the general election.183 Second, all states also regulate the
procedures that parties use to determine their general election nominees.
Primaries almost universally are required for legislative positions, and their
particular form typically is specified as well. The most common variants are
closed primaries (in which only party members may vote) and open primaries
(in which any voter may participate). Two rarer options are blanket
primaries (in which voters decide race by race in which party’s election to
cast a ballot) and top-two primaries (in which voters choose among all of the
available candidates and then the two with the most votes advance to the
general election).184
When party regulations are challenged, courts assess them using exactly
the same rights-and-interests framework that they employ in the franchise
restriction context. An array of rights potentially are implicated in these
disputes: the right of voters to cast a ballot for whom they please, the right of
candidates to run for office, and the right of parties to control their
nomination procedures. Burdens on these rights are weighed against
countervailing state interests such as avoiding voter confusion, increasing
voter participation, and promoting political stability.185 Some of the legal
literature is supportive of this methodology.186 Other scholars contend that
party regulations should be evaluated based on their implications for
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competition. They should be particularly suspect when they make it difficult
for third parties to qualify for the ballot187 or mute the policy differences
between the two major parties.188 Still other scholars maintain that party
autonomy is paramount, and that governmental intrusions into how parties
manage their affairs usually should be struck down.189 Yet another
perspective is that parties, especially when they conduct elections, are
nothing more than adjuncts of the state that may be regulated in whatever
fashion the state deems desirable.190
Under the alignment approach, on the other hand, the core concern about
party regulations is that they may produce misalignment, either by changing
the choices presented to voters in the general election, or by altering the
electorate that is entitled to participate in primary elections. Beginning with
ballot access requirements, they may result in partisan misalignment if they
enable a third party to qualify for the ballot and if this party then acts as a
“spoiler” that prevents the party preferred by the median voter from
prevailing. To return to a hypothetical that I have already mentioned,191
suppose that Party C qualifies for the general election ballot thanks to a
permissive regulation, and that it then receives 7% of the vote while Party A
gets 48% and Party B (the second choice of Party C supporters) gets 45%.
Then the lax rule is directly responsible for the partisan misalignment that
ensues. Party B would have won had Party C not made it onto the ballot.
This is not to say, of course, that third parties should be excluded from
American politics. They have played an important role at several historical
junctures,192 and the current two-party duopoly is unsatisfactory in many
respects. The point is only that third parties are potentially problematic in an
electoral system that relies on single-member districts and plurality voting
rules. If these aspects of the system were revisited, then third (and fourth,
and fifth) parties could compete vigorously without fomenting any fear of
partisan misfire.193
Ballot access requirements also may result in misalignment in two
subtler ways. First, as Michael Kang has noted, a common consequence of
sore loser laws is that moderate candidates who are defeated in primaries
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cannot run again in the general election, either as independents or under a
different party’s banner.194 If the laws did not exist, these candidates would
be able to run again—and if they won in the general election, closer policy
congruence would follow between their views and those of the moderate
median voter.195 Second, when a third party qualifies for the ballot thanks to
a lax regulation, policy misalignment may arise even if partisan
misalignment does not, due to the implications of the third party’s
involvement for the positioning of the two major parties. Imagine that a
centrist third party competes effectively for the support of voters in the
middle of the policy spectrum. Then the two major parties may safely shift
their positions toward the spectrum’s edges, because the votes they lose by
doing so go to the third party, not to their principal rivals. Policy divergence
thus may develop between the major parties—which in turn may produce
policy misalignment when one of these parties triumphs despite having
deviated from the preferences of the median voter.196
Regulations of party primaries may give rise to policy misalignment as
well, by making more likely the selection of nominees who are extreme
relative to the median voter. In particular, when jurisdictions requires
primaries to be closed to non-members, nominees tend to reflect the views of
the party’s median voter. This figure is quite different from—and more
ideologically polarized than—the median voter in the general election.
Conversely, when jurisdictions mandate open primaries, the distribution of
opinions in the primary electorate is more similar to the distribution in the
general electorate. Nominees therefore tend to diverge less from the
preferences of the median general election voter.197 This aligning effect is
even stronger when blanket or top-two primaries are employed. If voters
decide race by race in which party’s primary to cast ballots, then the gap
between the primary and general electorates shrinks as non-party members
“cross over” to participate in races that interest them.198 And if voters choose
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among all of the available candidates, then the gap between the electorates
disappears almost entirely and the median primary voter becomes almost
identical to the median general election voter.199
Under the alignment approach, then, judicial review of party regulations
would vary based on the type of rule at issue. If a rule is potentially
misaligning (such as a sore loser law), courts would engage in precisely the
same congruence-and-interests balancing as in the franchise restriction
context. The greater the likelihood of misalignment, the more compelling the
state’s interests would need to be for the rule to be sustained (and the tighter
the rule’s tailoring), and vice versa. Conversely, if a rule is potentially
aligning (such as a mandatory inclusive primary or a measure that restricts
third-party ballot qualification), courts would balance the rule’s potential
benefit in congruence against its attendant burden on parties’ associational
rights. The rule would be upheld if its aligning benefit were deemed to
outweigh its rights burden, and struck down if not. Alignment would be
treated as an additional state interest that could justify the encumbrance of
parties’ rights. Under either sort of inquiry, of course, accurate data about
the alignment or misalignment that is likely to ensue would be crucial.
Unfortunately, no political science studies address how often third party
involvement prevents the party preferred by the median voter from
prevailing. But in 2000, Ralph Nader’s presence on the ballot cost Al Gore
Florida (and with it the presidency),200 and in the most recent election, the
votes received by third parties exceeded the major party’s margin of victory
in about a dozen House races.201 With respect to the policy divergence that
third parties may generate, a British study found that the more seats the
centrist Liberal Democrats contest in an election, the higher the level of
polarization is between the Conservative and Labor Parties. When the
Liberal Democrats contest almost every seat, the gap between the major
parties’ policy platforms is more than twice as high as when they contest
only a handful of seats.202 Similarly, another study determined that states
with sore loser laws feature ideological differences between the Democratic
and Republican candidates that are 13% larger than in states without the
laws.203 The provisions’ presence also is linked to an increase in legislative
polarization, measured using incumbents’ voting records, of 5-10%.204
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As for party primaries, the majority of studies have concluded that
inclusive primaries bolster moderate candidates who are closer to the median
voter, while a minority have found no relationship between primary type and
policy alignment. According to the majority of scholarship, primary
electorates are ideologically more similar to general electorates under
inclusive systems;205 House members206 and state legislators207 elected via
inclusive systems adopt policy views more proximate to those of their
constituents; and in California, moderate candidates enjoyed greater electoral
success during the state’s experiment with the blanket primary in the
1990s.208 According to the academic minority, levels of polarization do not
vary among the states based on the kinds of primaries that they use,209 and
California’s more recent experiment with the top-two primary has not
narrowed the preference gap between elected officials and the median
voter.210 There is thus no consensus in the literature about the implications of
inclusive primaries, but the weight of authority does suggest that they have at
least some aligning effects.211
Accordingly, there again is no empirical impediment to the adoption of
the alignment approach in the party regulation context, and again the
available evidence confirms that misalignment is a genuine worry in this
domain. Courts would not be chasing chimeras by orienting their review of
party rules around the preference noncongruence that they may produce.
Next I consider how the field of campaign finance might look if it too were
organized around the alignment principle. I consider, that is, how money in
politics may distort the relationships between voters and their representatives
(and how the law may seek to correct these distortions).
C. Campaign Finance
A small number of policies are employed (or often proposed) to regulate
money in American politics. First, limits on contributions to candidates and
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other political actors apply at the federal level212 and in almost all states.213
Second, expenditure restrictions on candidates and other political actors used
to exist at the federal and state levels, but have been deemed unconstitutional
by the courts.214 Third, both contributions and expenditures typically must be
disclosed to the public.215 Lastly, public financing is available in presidential
elections216 and in about half of the states,217 in return for which candidates
usually must agree to limit their fundraising and spending. Despite these
measures, the total cost of American elections has increased steadily,
especially in recent years. Between 2000 and 2012, outlays approximately
doubled in campaigns for both Congress (from $1.7 billion to $3.6 billion)
and the White House (from $1.4 billion to $2.6 billion).218
When campaign finance laws are challenged, courts evaluate them using
a variant of the rights-and-interests balancing on which they rely in several
other domains. The right at issue in these cases is the freedom of speech: the
ability of citizens, candidates, and other actors to donate and spend money in
accordance with their political beliefs. The only countervailing state interest
that courts have recognized is the prevention of corruption and its
appearance.219 Expenditure restrictions are particularly suspect under this
framework, while contribution limits are reviewed more leniently.220 In the
legal literature, the most common argument is that another compelling
interest also justifies campaign finance laws: preventing inequalities in
wealth from being translated into inequalities in political influence. On this
view, political equality is a crucial value that is undermined when some
groups and individuals are able to dedicate far greater resources than others
to swaying electoral outcomes.221 Other perspectives stress the implications
of campaign finance laws for competition,222 the possibility that low-dollar

212

See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a).
See Contribution Limits, NCSL (Oct. 3, 2011), http://ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/
campaign-contribution-limits-overview.aspx.
214
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down bans on corporate expenditures);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down restrictions on expenditures by candidates and other
political actors). Prior to Citizens United, bans on corporate and union expenditures existed in about half
of the states. See Life After Citizens United, NCSL (Jan. 4, 2011), http://ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/
elections/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx.
215
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 434, 441d.
216
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-42.
217
See Public Financing of Campaigns, NCSL (Jan. 23, 2013), http://ncsl.org/ legislatures-elections/
elections/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx. The extent of public financing various widely
among these states, from tax incentives for citizens to full governmental funding. See id.
218
See Total Election Cost, supra note 4.
219
See FEC v. Nat. Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985).
220
See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246-48 (2006); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986) (“[R]estrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than
restrictions on independent spending.”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25.
221
See, e.g., David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 237 (1991);
Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1204 (1994); David A. Strauss,
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1994).
222
See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 111, 138; Klarman, supra note 49, at 522.
213

47

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

donations could enhance opportunities for civic participation,223 and the
impairment of representation that follows when candidates devote too much
of their time to fundraising.224
Under the alignment approach, in contrast, the fear about money in
politics is that it may cause the preferences of voters and representatives to
diverge—and the hope is that well-crafted regulations may prevent this
divergence from emerging. To begin with, partisan misalignment may occur
when asymmetric spending creates a gap between the median actual voter
and the median hypothetical voter exposed to more even expenditures.
Suppose that Candidate A outspends Candidate B by a large margin and then
wins the election.225 Suppose also that had Candidate A and Candidate B
spent the same amount of money, Candidate B would have prevailed. Then
the partisan preference of the median actual voter is realized, but that of the
median hypothetical voter exposed to more even outlays is not. Relatedly,
unbalanced spending may give rise to policy misalignment even in the
absence of partisan misalignment. Imagine that Candidate A outspends
Candidate B by a large margin, wins comfortably, and then embraces the
views of the median voter. Imagine too that had Candidate A and Candidate
B spent the same amount of money, Candidate A still would have won, but
the median voter would have arrived at different policy views. Then the
policy preferences of the median actual voter again are satisfied, but those of
the median hypothetical voter exposed to more even outlays again are not.226
These forms of misalignment may seem less troubling than most of the
other varieties discussed in this Article. This is because the figure whose
preferences are not realized in these scenarios—the median hypothetical
voter exposed to more symmetric spending—is not highly normatively
compelling, at least not to most contemporary Americans. For better or
worse, our democracy is not committed to the notion that campaign spending
should be equalized, let alone to the idea that the “right” electoral outcomes
are those that would arise under conditions of even outlays.227 Still, there is
at least some force to the argument that voter preferences should not be
reshaped by lopsided spending, because then election results reflect the
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uneven expenditures rather than voters’ balanced assessments of their needs
and interests. The above forms of misalignment capture this view, even
though it is not the dominant perspective in the campaign finance context.
The other kind of misalignment that may arise from money in politics
derives not from candidates’ spending but rather from their fundraising.
Candidates at all levels, of course, must raise money to fund their campaigns.
They are therefore likely to be quite attentive to the policy preferences of
their donors, since it is the donors who provide them with the resources they
need to run successfully for office. If the donors differ in their policy views
from the electorate as a whole, then policy misalignment ensues to the extent
that candidates espouse the positions of the median donor rather than those of
the median voter.228 And donors do typically differ from voters at large, in
that they are wealthier, better educated, and, by definition, more politically
active.229 Their high socioeconomic status endows donors with a distinctive
set of views on many policy issues,230 while their high political engagement
tends to polarize them ideologically relative to the general population.231
Under the alignment approach, then, the central issue for courts assessing
campaign finance laws would be the measures’ capacity to curb the
noncongruence that stems from electoral spending and fundraising. If the
laws promise to exert substantial aligning effects, then courts would be more
likely to tolerate the burden they impose on First Amendment rights, and vice
versa. This methodology probably would result in expenditure restrictions
being upheld more often than under the status quo. Since asymmetric
spending may give rise to partisan and policy misalignment, it follows that
measures aimed at evening outlays sometimes would be valid. Contribution
limits also typically would be sustained under the alignment approach, even
if they are quite low. When candidates must solicit smaller contributions
from larger numbers of donors, the median donor ceases to be so different
from the median voter. Lastly, public financing regimes would sit on even
sturdier legal ground than they do today. If candidates receive comparable
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resources from the state and have less need to solicit donations on their own,
then both relevant forms of misalignment are addressed in a single stroke.232
In the political science literature, scholars are divided as to both whether
asymmetric spending influences election results and whether laws that tend
to equalize expenditures have any electoral impact. With respect to
spending, studies have found that Republican presidential candidates average
a 3.5% increase in vote margin thanks to their financial advantage over
Democratic candidates,233 and that a 1% change in a party’s share of
campaign receipts results in a 0.5% change in the party’s share of state senate
seats.234 But studies also have determined that spending by incumbents
makes almost no difference in U.S. House races (although challenger
spending is somewhat more effective).235 Similarly, with respect to
campaign finance laws, studies have found that corporate contribution limits
increase the share of state legislative seats held by Democrats by anywhere
from 2.1% to 6.0%,236 and that the Supreme Court’s recent rejection of all
corporate spending bans made Republican candidates 2.0% more likely to
prevail in the 2010 election.237 But studies also have determined that
contribution limits have no impact on vote margins in gubernatorial
elections,238 and that corporate and union spending bans are unrelated to seat
shares239 and policy liberalism240 in state legislatures.
In contrast to this muddled picture, there is near consensus in the
empirical literature that politicians’ positions more accurately reflect the
views of their donors than those of their constituents. This heightened
sensitivity to donor preferences is evident, first, in the bimodality of
politicians’ voting records, which matches the twin-peaked distribution of
donors but not the more normal distribution of voters. Other forces are
responsible for legislative polarization too, but a crucial “contributing factor
[is] the relative extremism of donating voters.”241 The influence of donors on

232
I recognize, of course, that most existing public financing regimes neither provide for perfectly
even spending nor end the need to fundraise. They therefore reduce the misalignment caused by money in
politics, but they do not eliminate it.
233
See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 120 (2008).
234
See Andrew B. Hall, Systemic Effects of Campaign Spending 18 (Mar. 24, 2013).
235
See Steven D. Levitt, Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on
Election Outcomes in the U.S. House, 102 J. POL. ECON. 777, 780 (1994); Thomas Stratmann, Money in
Politics, 124 PUB. CHOICE 135, 138 (2005).
236
See Besley & Case, supra note 174, at 27, 31; Hall, supra note 234, at 28.
237
See Tilman Klumpp et al., Money Talks 9 (Sept. 2012).
238
See GROSS & GOIDEL, supra note 229, at 80-81; David M. Primo et al., State Campaign Finance
Reform, Competitiveness, and Party Advantage in Gubernatorial Elections, in THE MARKETPLACE OF
DEMOCRACY 269, 279 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 2006).
239
See Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, The (Non-)Effects of Campaign Finance Spending
Bans on Macro Political Outcomes 16 (Mar. 1, 2012).
240
See Timothy Werner & John J. Coleman, Assessing the Potential Effects of Citizens United 20
(Feb. 21, 2013).
241
Bafumi & Herron, supra note 66, at 536; see also Christopher Ellis, Understanding Economic
Biases in Representation, 65 POL. RES. Q. 938, 945 (2012) (presenting regression results showing that
large donors are closer ideologically to their representatives and tend to get their preferred policies enacted
more frequently); Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 231, at 35.

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

50

elected officials also is evident in the much greater attention that politicians
pay to the views of their wealthy constituents. According to an array of
studies, the preferences of the rich exert a powerful impact on the voting
records of House members242 and senators,243 as well as on actual policy
outcomes at the federal244 and state245 levels. By comparison, the preferences
of the middle class have only a modest effect, and the preferences of the poor
make almost no difference at all.246 Again, there are several explanations for
this divergent pattern of representation, but again, “wealthy individuals’
much greater propensity to contribute . . . plays an important role in
explaining why high wealth groups enjoy greater responsiveness.”247
The available evidence therefore indicates that fundraising-induced
misalignment is a significant threat, while spending-induced misalignment is
a more uncertain proposition. Since the normative case for worrying about
the latter kind of noncongruence is weaker as well, the implication is that
courts (and scholars) should concentrate on the former. Politicians’
proclivity to better represent their donors than their constituents is both
democratically troubling and empirically corroborated, and it would be the
focus of the alignment approach in the campaign finance context.
D. Redistricting
I turn next to redistricting, the decennial redrawing of congressional,
state, and local district boundaries. When they reshape their district lines,
jurisdictions must comply with the one-person, one-vote rule, which compels
almost perfect population equality at the congressional level248 and a high
degree of equality at the state level too.249 Jurisdictions also must comply
with the nebulous constitutional prohibition of gerrymandering.250 An array
of race-related requirements apply to redistricting as well, and are discussed
in the next Section.251 Lastly, many states impose additional line-drawing
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criteria such as compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and respect
for communities of interest.252
When courts consider equal population challenges to district plans, they
understand the potential injury to be entirely personal. The right to vote
belongs to the particular individual, and it is violated if districts vary
unjustifiably in population.253 In contrast, courts do not currently adhere to
any coherent theory in gerrymandering disputes.254 But during the two
decades in which a justiciable standard did exist in this domain, it
emphasized both adverse election results and (somewhat oddly) restrictions
on voter participation.255 In the legal literature, scholars tend to accept the
courts’ conceptual framework in malapportionment cases, though they
sometimes offer structural twists on the one-person, one-vote rule.256 With
respect to gerrymandering, the most prominent camp contends that its key
harm is the lack of competition that ensues when incumbents are placed in
overly safe districts.257 Other perspectives stress how symmetrically the
major parties are treated,258 the shape and composition of individual
districts,259 and whether the purpose underlying a plan is excessively
partisan.260
Under the alignment approach, on the other hand, the chief concern
about district boundaries is that they may give rise to preference
noncongruence—both within particular constituencies and in the jurisdiction
as a whole. At the district level, policy misalignment may develop if highly
demographically, socioeconomically, or ideologically heterogeneous
constituencies are drawn. The signals that the residents of such districts
convey to their representatives are unusually varied and difficult to interpret.
The representatives therefore may be unsure how to act in accordance with
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the wishes of the median voter, and instead may take their behavioral cues
from their donors, political parties, or personal predilections. To illustrate
the point, suppose that one district is half rich and half poor, while another is
mostly middle-class. It may be harder for the representative of the former
district to identify and vote consistently with the views of the median voter.
It may be easier, that is, for policy misalignment to emerge.261
At the legislative level, both malapportionment and gerrymandering may
produce both partisan and policy misalignment. Malapportionment may
result in partisan misalignment when there are partisan patterns to districts’
population discrepancies. Imagine that a state has ten districts and a
thousand voters, of whom 52% are Democrats and 48% are Republicans.
Imagine also that two of the districts have 200 voters (of whom 140 are
Democrats and 60 are Republicans), while eight of the districts have 75
voters (of whom 30 are Democrats and 45 are Republicans). Then the
overpopulation of the Democratic districts and the underpopulation of the
Republican districts give rise to a startling degree of partisan misalignment.
Eight of the ten districts elect Republicans while the state’s median voter is a
Democrat.
A minor adjustment to this hypothetical demonstrates how
malapportionment may produce policy misalignment even in the absence of
partisan misalignment.262 If the two overpopulated Democratic districts each
have 125 Democrats and 75 Republicans, then the state’s median voter
becomes a Republican and there is no longer any partisan misalignment. But
policy misalignment is still probable because, while the electorate now leans
Republican by a miniscule 51%-49% margin, the median district features a
much larger 60%-40% Republican advantage. The state’s median voter thus
is likely to be a center-right moderate, but, as long as politicians’ positions
are related to the partisan makeup of their districts,263 the legislature’s
median member is likely to be substantially more conservative.
Analogously, gerrymandering may result in partisan misalignment when
there are partisan patterns to districts’ margins of victory (even if the districts
are equal in population). Take the above state with its ten districts, thousand
voters, and 51%-49% Republican-Democratic composition. If three of the
districts elect Republicans by a 72%-28% margin, while seven of them elect
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Democrats by a 58%-42% margin, then a stark partisan mismatch arises
between the state’s median voter (a Republican) and the legislature’s median
member (a Democrat). Again, a small tweak to the hypothetical shows how
gerrymandering may generate policy misalignment even in the absence of
partisan misalignment. If the first three districts elect Republicans by a
narrower 62%-38% margin, then the state’s overall composition shifts to
52% Democratic and there is no longer any partisan misalignment. But
policy misalignment is still probable because the median district (at 58%
Democratic) diverges considerably from the midpoint of the electorate. The
state’s median voter is likely to be a center-left moderate, while the
legislature’s median member is likely to be more liberal.264
Under the alignment approach, then, courts would evaluate both
individual districts and entire district plans by weighing their misaligning
potential against the legitimate interests they advance. At the district level,
courts would be skeptical of highly heterogeneous constituencies because of
the policy misalignment they promote. Such districts might be permitted
only if they are necessary for compliance with the one-person, one-vote rule,
the Voting Rights Act (VRA), or some similarly pressing state goal.265 At
the legislative level, the reddest flag for courts would be district plans that
threaten, through either malapportionment or gerrymandering, to give one
party control of the legislature even though the state’s median voter prefers
the opposing party.266 Such plans might be upheld only if there is no
alternative that is consistent with the applicable legal requirements. Lastly,
courts would be wary as well of plans that result in large divergences
between a state’s median district and its electorate as a whole. Plans of this
sort tend to produce policy misalignment in the legislature, and thus would
require a compelling justification to be sustained.267
In the political science literature, substantial evidence confirms the
danger of policy misalignment in highly heterogeneous districts. One study
found that as the ideological diversity of Los Angeles-area districts increases,
elected officials become less likely to abide by the preferences of the median
voter, and more likely to vote in unison with their party.268 Another study
determined that the policy positions taken by Senate candidates are less
congruent with the views of the median voter in states that are more
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demographically or ideologically diverse.269 Still other studies concluded
that incumbent senators’ votes on free trade issues are better explained by
constituency characteristics in socioeconomically homogeneous states, but
by partisan affiliation in diverse states.270 And in my own prior work, I have
found that House members’ voting records correspond more closely to key
district attributes in geographically homogeneous constituencies, but to
partisanship in spatially diverse districts.271
With respect to partisan misalignment at the legislative level, political
scientists have devised a metric—partisan bias—that captures the concept
almost perfectly. Partisan bias refers to the divergence in the share of seats
that each party would win given the same share of the statewide vote.272 For
example, if Democrats would win 48% of the seats with 50% of the vote (in
which case Republicans would win 52% of the seats), then a district plan
would have a pro-Republican bias of 2%. Bias typically is calculated at the
point at which each party receives 50% of the vote, 273 and thus reveals both
whether and to what extent partisan misalignment exists.
Because population equality has now been required for half a century, it
is necessary to look to an earlier era to determine the misaligning effects of
malapportionment. Prior to the Supreme Court’s intervention in the 1960s,274
then, there was a persistent pro-Republican bias of about 6% in House
elections held in non-southern states.275 Interestingly, however, this bias was
the result not of unequal population but rather of gerrymandering by
Republican-controlled legislatures. The average Democratic district was
actually somewhat smaller in population than the average Republican
district, and it was the heavily Republican suburbs that were most sharply
underrepresented.276 But while malapportionment was not a major driver of
partisan misalignment in this period, it does seem to have fostered policy
misalignment. Underrepresented counties consistently received fewer state
funds than overrepresented counties, suggesting that governmental spending
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did not correspond to the views of the median voter.277 These distributional
inequities vanished within years of the Court’s decisions as rural areas lost
their longstanding overrepresentation.278 So too did the pro-Republican bias
in much of the country, though due to not population equality but rather the
substitution of neutral plans for maps that favored the Republicans.279
As for the bias attributable to gerrymandering, it has fluctuated widely
over the years, but is now both higher and more tilted in a Republican
direction than at any other point in modern history. According to one study,
there was an overall pro-Republican bias of about 6% in the 2012 House
election, the highest figure since 1956.280 According to my own calculations,
the typical 2012 congressional plan featured an absolute bias of about 11%
and a net pro-Republican bias of about 6%, both the highest scores in my
1966-2012 database.281 Not surprisingly, scholars have found that when a
party is in full control of a state government, the district plans it enacts tend
to award it about 6% more seats than if the opposing party had been
responsible for redistricting.282 The recent spike in pro-Republican bias thus
stems from the Republicans’ capture of many state houses in 2010, right
before the latest redistricting cycle began. However, it is important to note
that not all bias is the product of gerrymandering. The geographic
distribution of the parties’ supporters—in particular, the overconcentration of
Democratic voters in urban areas—also influences the level of bias, and
indeed is thought by some scholars to be its most significant determinant.283
Accordingly, the empirical case for the alignment approach is strongest
with respect to the policy misalignment caused by heterogeneous districts
and the partisan misalignment caused by gerrymandering. In both of these
areas, there is abundant evidence that misalignment exists, can be measured
accurately, and is substantial in magnitude. In contrast, there is less proof at
present regarding the misaligning effects of malapportionment or policy
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misalignment at the legislative level. Courts (and policymakers) thus would
be wise to defer intervention on these grounds until the harms to be
addressed have been established more definitively.
E. Minority Representation
The final election law topic that I examine here is minority
representation: specifically, the set of statutory and constitutional rules that
help determine the composition and number of districts in which minority
groups are able to elect their preferred candidates. Under section 2 of the
VRA, large and geographically concentrated minority groups typically are
entitled to the construction of districts in which they comprise a majority of
the population.284 Under section 5 of the statute, certain jurisdictions (mostly
in the South) formerly were required to receive federal approval in order for
their district plans to go into effect, and were prohibited from reducing their
existing levels of minority representation.285 And under the Equal Protection
Clause, intentional racial vote dilution is forbidden,286 as is the formation of
districts with race as the predominant motive (i.e., racial gerrymandering).287
To the extent courts subscribe to an overarching theory in this domain, it
is that minority groups’ claims to representation are most compelling when
either their ability to participate in the political process has been burdened or
they constitute cohesive geographic communities. In its first wave of vote
dilution cases in the 1970s, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of minority
plaintiffs only when they could demonstrate some kind of participational
impairment.288
More recently, majority-minority districts have been
mandated under section 2, and upheld against racial gerrymandering
challenges, only when they have corresponded to distinct minority
communities.289 In the legal literature, some scholars argue that the VRA
should be extended to all minority groups, including geographically diffuse
ones,290 or to all instances of racially polarized voting.291 Other scholars
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contend that the VRA may no longer be necessary now that one-party
Democratic rule in the South has been replaced with robust two-party
competition.292 Still other scholars believe that majority-minority districts
conflict with a constitutional commitment to colorblindness, and thus are
inherently illegitimate.293
Under the alignment approach, in contrast, the worry about policies that
promote minority representation is that they may produce preference
noncongruence too, at the levels of both the individual district and the entire
legislature. At the district level, the VRA may encourage the creation of
constituencies that are highly heterogeneous with respect to both race and
other politically salient factors. (As discussed above, such constituencies
foster policy misalignment by hindering elected officials from identifying
and responding to their constituents’ views.294) The reason why the VRA
may give rise to racially diverse districts is simply that it requires majorityminority districts to be drawn in many circumstances.295 Such districts
necessarily are racially diverse as long as the minority group’s share of the
population is not extremely high. Similarly, there are two reasons why the
VRA may generate districts that are heterogeneous with respect to non-racial
factors. First, dissimilar minority populations often need to be combined in
order to muster a district-wide majority,296 and second, these groups often
need to be joined with miscellaneous “filler people” in order to hit the district
population target.297
At the legislative level, the VRA may result in misalignment by
inefficiently “packing” Democrats into majority-minority districts. Suppose
that a state has ten districts and a thousand voters, of whom 51% are
Democrats and 30% are African Americans. Suppose also that initially six of
the districts are 36% black and 55% Democratic,298 but that subsequently a
successful VRA lawsuit forces the state to create three majority-minority
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districts that are 58% black and 79% Democratic.299 Then the VRA is
responsible for shifting the state from partisan congruence to stark partisan
misalignment, with seven Republican districts out of ten even though the
median voter is a Democrat. Analogously, if the state is 49% rather than
51% Democratic, then the VRA gives rise to policy misalignment even in the
absence of partisan misalignment. In this scenario, the median voter and the
median member of the legislature are both Republicans—but the median
voter is a center-right moderate while the median member (representing a
61% Republican district) is substantially more conservative.300 Of course,
these are precisely the same misaligning effects that may be induced by
conventional gerrymanders too.301
It should be emphasized, however, that these misaligning effects are not
inevitable.
For one thing, majority-minority districts need not
overconcentrate Democrats. If minority members comprise just over 50% of
such districts’ populations, and if the districts’ non-minority residents are
heavily Republican, then Democratic votes are not squandered needlessly.302
Similarly, after the requisite number of majority-minority districts have been
drawn, other districts may be constructed in which Democrats are reasonably
likely to prevail. In southern states with racially polarized voting, these often
take the form of 30-50% black districts in which a relatively small number of
white votes suffice to hand victory to Democratic candidates. Whether the
VRA exerts a misaligning influence therefore depends on how exactly
district lines are configured. If minority voters are packed into a few districts
and dispersed among the rest, then misalignment is likely to follow. But if
the filler people in majority-minority districts are staunch Republicans, and if
additional districts are formed in which biracial coalitions often elect
Democrats, then substantial minority representation indeed is compatible
with legislative alignment.303
Under the alignment approach, then, courts would strive to realize the
VRA’s goal of racial inclusion while also reducing the risk of preference
noncongruence in both individual districts and the legislature as a whole. At
the district level, courts would favor constituencies whose minority and non-
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minority members are socioeconomically and culturally similar, and would
frown on districts whose residents are excessively heterogeneous. Current
VRA doctrine already requires courts to consider the variation within
districts’ minority populations,304 so it presumably would be possible for
courts to examine instead the variation within districts’ entire populations.
At the legislative level, the judicial focus would be on the levels of partisan
and policy misalignment associated with different district plans. The judicial
aim would be to minimize these levels while still providing for a comparable
degree of minority representation. Plans therefore might be returned to their
drafters even if minorities already were represented adequately, on the
ground that the adequate representation could have been achieved at a lower
misalignment cost.
In the political science literature, there is substantial evidence that
majority-minority districts are heterogeneous along a number of dimensions
(and thus prone to policy misalignment). With respect to race, America’s
twenty-six majority-black House districts in the 2000s had an average black
population of 59%, and the most heavily black district in the country
(Illinois’s Second) was only 69% black.305 Given current demographic
patterns, it apparently is infeasible to construct majority-minority House
districts that are as racially homogeneous as many majority-white districts.
With respect to political views, similarly, a recent study discovered a strong
relationship between ideological diversity and the size of a district’s minority
population.306 The relationship stems from both the wide range of opinions
held by minority members and the gap between their opinions and those of
whites.307 With respect to other key variables too, I have found in earlier
work that majority-minority districts are particularly heterogeneous. For
example, majority-black House districts in the 2000s exhibited greater spatial
variation than their peers in terms of both socioeconomic status and
urbanism.308
The empirical literature also documents the adverse partisan and policy
impact that the VRA may have on Democrats and minorities, respectively.
In the 1990s, southern states drew many more majority-minority districts
than they had in previous decades, due to both amendments in 1982 that
strengthened the VRA and aggressive federal enforcement of the statute.309
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309
See Introduction, in REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 1, 1 (David A. Bositis ed.,
1998) (“Following the 1990 reapportionment, there was a quantum increase in minority representation in
the U.S. House of Representatives, in state legislatures, and elsewhere.”). The changes in minority
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According to an array of studies, the creation of the new majority-minority
districts harmed the Democrats electorally at both the congressional and state
legislative levels. The Democrats lost about a dozen House seats as a direct
consequence,310 and they also suffered setbacks in every southern state
legislature (including the Republican capture of two state houses for the first
time since Reconstruction).311
Ironically, the greater descriptive
representation that minorities obtained in this period did not even result in
improved substantive representation. Several studies concluded that the
hostile stances of the newly elected Republicans on issues such as civil rights
more than outweighed the favorable positions of the new minority
politicians.312
Unfortunately, the literature on the 1990s redistricting cycle has not
addressed alignment explicitly (because it has not analyzed the partisan and
policy swings that occurred in relation to the preferences of the median
voter). Nor have the studies establishing the heterogeneity of majorityminority districts sought to determine whether they, like other diverse
districts, undermine the quality of representation. Still, there is enough
evidence in the existing scholarship for courts to be confident that
misalignment is a real possibility in this domain. There is no reason why
district diversity would have different consequences in the majority-minority
context,313 nor is it plausible that the median voter in the 1990s shifted as
rapidly as did electoral outcomes and representatives’ policy views.
Accordingly, the alignment approach is empirically viable in this area too—
and, if adopted, it would strike an attractive balance between minority
representation on the one hand and preference congruence on the other.
*

*

*

representation in subsequent decades were much less dramatic, and thus have received less attention in the
literature.
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Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in
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54 POL. RES. Q. 31, 44 (2001).
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Much more could be said, of course, about how the alignment approach
applies to the debates that dominate the field of election law. Past cases
could be reexamined based on their aligning implications, specific standards
could be proposed to convert theory into workable doctrine, and empirical
analyses could be conducted to investigate the prevalence of misalignment.
In future work, I plan to flesh out the approach in exactly these ways. Here,
however, my aim has been merely to offer a snapshot—not an exhaustive
exegesis—of what election law might look like through the alignment prism.
If I have persuaded the reader that the prism is novel to the case law and
legal literature, appealing because of its democratic antecedents, and
amenable to quantification by social scientists, then I have met my goal. The
precise details of how the approach would operate in each electoral context I
leave for another day.
IV. THE LIMITS OF ALIGNMENT
To this point, I have focused on the affirmative case for the alignment
approach. But it also is important to acknowledge the approach’s limitations:
the reasons why it cannot be applied to every election law dispute and cannot
guarantee that voters’ preferences in fact are congruent with those of their
representatives. It is to these limitations that I turn in this Part. I first
concede that alignment is just one of several compelling democratic values.
Other values may be more salient than alignment in certain kinds of cases,
and alignment is less applicable when it conflicts with competing concerns or
when there is no serious risk of noncongruence. I then explain why election
law cannot hope to solve the problem of misalignment by itself. Many of the
factors that produce misalignment are political, historical, geographical, or
even psychological—and thus beyond the domain of the law, at least as the
domain commonly is understood. Law can (and should) exert an aligning
influence, but the actual achievement of preference congruence would
require more than legal reform.
A. Value Pluralism
As several scholars have recognized,314 elections implicate, and seek to
realize, a range of democratic values. This Article’s thesis is that preference
alignment is one of these values, indeed one of the most significant of them.
But it plainly is not the only relevant consideration in the electoral sphere.
Other noteworthy concerns (most of which have been mentioned already)
include: protecting individual rights such as the franchise and the freedom to
advocate one’s political views; promoting electoral competition, especially
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See, e.g., Charles, supra note 21, at 1142; Fishkin, supra note 42, at 1297 (defending idea of
“‘election law pluralism’: the proposition that there are multiple, irreducibly distinct interests at stake in
voting controversies”); Pildes, supra note 32, at 690.
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when there is a danger of incumbent entrenchment; increasing voter
participation, turnout in particular; respecting the political equality of all
citizens; and ensuring that minorities are represented adequately in the halls
of power.315 These values derive from an array of cogent theories and cannot
easily be ranked relative to one another. Alignment therefore cannot pretend
to clear the field of competing objectives. It is a valuable democratic goal,
but it is not the only such goal.
In which doctrinal contexts are each of these values most salient? This is
not the place for a definitive answer to this question, but I offer below some
tentative assessments, all based on the proposition that values apply most
urgently where they face the greatest potential threats. First, the protection
of individual rights seems most relevant in the franchise restriction, party
regulation, and campaign finance fields. These are the areas in which
governmental action most directly may burden people’s rights to vote,
associate, or promote their political opinions.316
Second, electoral
competition likely matters most in the party regulation, redistricting, and
franchise restriction contexts.317 Stringent ballot access requirements may
prevent rival groups from even being able to challenge incumbent parties,
while bipartisan gerrymanders and impediments to voting may make
elections glaringly uncompetitive even if they nominally are contested.
Third, voter participation probably is most germane in the franchise
restriction field, in which measures that make it more difficult to vote may
cause turnout to plummet.318 Participation also is a concern (albeit a lesser
one) in the party regulation and redistricting areas, in which inclusive
primaries319 and homogeneous constituencies,320 respectively, may result in
modest turnout increases. Fourth, political equality appears most applicable
in the franchise restriction, campaign finance, and redistricting contexts. The
norm is undermined when certain people, relative to their peers, vote with
greater ease, expend more resources to sway elections, or reside in less
populous districts.321 Lastly, minority representation is implicated most
directly by the legal rules that help determine where minority groups will be

315

See supra Part I.
See Fishkin, supra note 42, at 1292 (arguing that rights-and-interests balancing is “right approach
to the rapidly expanding area of litigation now known as ‘the new vote denial’”).
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these areas. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 37, at 601-30 (addressing redistricting); Issacharoff &
Pildes, supra note 26, at 652-87 (addressing franchise restriction and party regulation); Klarman, supra
note 49, at 513-17, 521-22 (addressing redistricting and party regulation).
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319
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able to elect their preferred candidates.322 The value also is at stake in
disputes over voting regulations that may disproportionately affect minority
members.
Alignment, then, is a less compelling objective when (and to the extent
that) it conflicts with the achievement of these other goals in the areas in
which they are most salient. Fortunately, there seems to be little tension
between alignment and voter participation or political equality. Alignment
and voter participation both are advanced by the lifting of franchise
restrictions, the use of inclusive primaries, and the creation of homogeneous
districts. Similarly, alignment and political equality both are furthered by
liberal voting rules, equally populated districts, and policies that increase the
quantity and decrease the variation of campaign contributions. Not
surprisingly, different democratic values sometimes point in the same
direction.
But sometimes different values point in different directions. For
instance, party and campaign finance regulations may burden the freedom of
speech while also exerting an aligning influence. There is no alternative to
balancing in this situation—to weighing the cost in rights protection against
the benefit in preference congruence.323 The regulations’ implications for
individual liberties cannot simply be overlooked if the liberties indeed matter
in these contexts. Analogously, alignment and competition offer divergent
perspectives on strict ballot access requirements, inclusive primaries, and
incumbent-protecting district plans. Competition theorists oppose all three
policies,324 while the alignment approach favors the first two and is agnostic
about the third.325 The approach’s prescriptions thus can be followed only if
the relevant decision-maker has made the difficult decision to prioritize
alignment over competition. Lastly, as noted earlier, the goals of alignment
and minority representation clash when certain kinds of majority-minority
districts are drawn.326 However, this conflict is not as stark since it often is
possible to create an equivalent number of majority-minority districts without
generating misalignment at either the district or legislative levels.327
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See Karlan, supra note 59, at 1740 (arguing that “central task of modern voting rights law must be
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See supra Sections III.B-C (advocating such balancing); see also Farber, supra note 61, at 377
(arguing that when election law values conflict the best “strategy is to ‘satisfice’: try to achieve a
minimum satisfactory level of each one”).
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Competition theorists oppose strict ballot access requirements because they keep third parties off
the ballot; they oppose inclusive primaries because they mute the policy differences between the major
parties; and they oppose incumbent-protecting district plans because they make elections less competitive.
See supra notes 187-188, 257 and accompanying text.
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The alignment approach favors strict ballot access requirements (assuming single-member
districts and plurality voting rules) because they reduce the risk of a third-party spoiler; it favors inclusive
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The alignment approach also is less applicable when the threat of
misalignment is less severe. If the danger against which the approach guards
is less apt to materialize, then the rationale for employing the approach
(potentially at some cost to other election law values) weakens in tandem.
Earlier in the Article I cited the best available estimates of the extent of
misalignment in different areas. These estimates often were substantial—but
sometimes they were rather small. For example, in the franchise restriction
context, photo ID laws seem to produce a pro-Republican swing of only 12%, and closing dates for voter registration and purges of voter rolls
apparently have no partisan consequences.328 Likewise, in the party
regulation field, third parties rarely play the role of spoiler, and the evidence
about the aligning effects of inclusive primaries is mixed.329 In the campaign
finance arena too, the literature is divided as to whether uneven spending
alters election outcomes and whether expenditure limits have any electoral
impact.330 In all of these areas, I therefore would hesitate to endorse the
alignment approach unequivocally. Misalignment is a theoretical possibility
in each context, but the existing data does not permit the conclusion that it is
an empirical certainty.
In a few additional contexts (which I have ignored until now for this very
reason), misalignment is not even a theoretical possibility. Here there is no
reason to invoke alignment instead of one of the other values that elections
seek to realize. Fusion candidacies, in which multiple parties nominate the
same candidate and then all of the candidate’s votes are aggregated, present
one such case.331 Since any votes that a third party receives when it
nominates a major party candidate accrue to the candidate, there is no risk of
a spoiler when fusion is permitted. Internal party affairs that do not pertain
to ballot access or nominee selection are another topic about which the
alignment approach has little to say.
Neither attendance at party
conventions,332 nor the organization of party committees,333 to cite the facts
of two leading cases, can give rise to any form of misalignment. Still another
issue that is unrelated to alignment is the disclosure of campaign
contributions and expenditures. As long as voters’ partisan and policy
preferences are not affected by disclosure (and there is no evidence that they
are), the availability of this information has no aligning implications.
Accordingly, the alignment approach cannot be applied unthinkingly to
every kind of election law dispute. Sometimes the threat of misalignment is
real, but other important values are implicated as well and demand to be
considered. Sometimes the threat of misalignment is insignificant, in which
case the argument for taking other considerations into account is even
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stronger. And sometimes misalignment is not a possibility at all, meaning
that other concerns are the only ones that need to be heeded. Unsurprisingly,
there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the many problems of election law.
The alignment approach often is the most democratically appealing and
empirically supported framework for deciding these cases. But occasionally
it is not.
B. Law’s Domain
Suppose that every legal reform advocated by this Article were
implemented. Franchise restrictions that disproportionately affect particular
political groups would be eliminated. Blanket or top-two primaries would be
used to select nominees. Campaign contributions and expenditures would be
limited and generous public financing would be provided. And district plans
would be drawn so as to minimize partisan bias while still maintaining the
requisite level of minority representation. Would these policies end the
scourge of misalignment once and for all? No, they would not. They
undoubtedly would help, but, as I next discuss, there are many reasons why
voters’ and representatives’ preferences may diverge, only some of which lie
within the domain of election law.
These other explanations for
misalignment are highly varied, sounding in partisan influence, legislative
structure, political geography, and candidate psychology, among others.
What they have in common is that none relates to a topic that the law of
democracy typically is thought to address.334
To begin with, political scientists have identified a host of non-legal
factors that may result in policy misalignment at the district level (that is,
divergence between the policy preferences of the median voter and those of
her representative). Of these, partisan pressures probably are the most
important. Inside the legislature, party leaders urge representatives to vote
with their party and threaten them with various adverse consequences—
inferior committee assignments, reduced campaign contributions, perhaps
even primary challenges—if they fail to do so.335 Outside the legislature,
party activists, who are much more polarized than the general electorate,
lobby candidates to shift their policy positions in the activists’ direction.
Candidates often comply because the activists’ volunteer service, campaign
donations, and general enthusiasm are the lifeblood of their campaigns.336
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The products of these partisan forces are politicians whose policy stances are
more consistent with their party’s views than with those of the median
voter.337
Institutional features of state government also may have significant
aligning implications at the district level. According to one study, both
legislative professionalization and the presence of term limits are linked to
higher levels of congruence between public opinion and public policy.338
More professional legislators have greater resources to ascertain the views of
the electorate, while term-limited legislators are less beholden to parties and
other actors whose stances may differ from those of voters.339 According to
another set of studies, the availability of the voter initiative promotes policy
correspondence as well. At least with respect to issues that are likely to be
the subjects of ballot measures, politicians tend to diverge less from the
preferences of their constituents—perhaps because they fear embarrassment
if their positions are repudiated by the electorate.340
Still other non-legal factors that may affect district-level policy
alignment are psychological in nature, relating to the perceptions that
representatives and voters have of one another.341 With respect to
representatives (especially on the Republican side of the aisle), they typically
believe that their constituents are far more conservative than they actually
are.342 The representatives therefore may think that they are voting in
accordance with their constituents’ preferences when in fact they are not.343
With respect to voters, they tend to ascribe their own views to representatives
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of whom they approve, often asserting erroneously that the representatives’
votes are more consistent with their preferences than the votes actually are.344
Voters also display high levels of partisan loyalty, casting ballots for
candidates from their preferred party even if other candidates are closer to
them in policy terms.345 Voters thus are likely both to fail to grasp the true
extent of policy misalignment (if they like their representatives) and to vote
for candidates despite the misalignment that they do perceive (if the
candidates hail from the right party).
At the legislative level, political geography is the most potent driver of
partisan misalignment that falls outside the scope of election law. As noted
earlier, Democratic voters tend to be highly concentrated in urban areas,
while Republican supporters tend to be distributed more efficiently in
suburban, exurban, and rural regions.346 This spatial pattern frequently
results in district plans that exhibit a marked pro-Republican bias—even if
the line-drawing authority did not aim to advantage either party. A recent
study designed hypothetical congressional and state legislative plans for
twenty states using only contiguity and compactness as criteria.347 Almost all
of the resulting plans strongly favored the Republicans, sometimes by 15%
or more, despite the absence of any partisan intent in their formation.348 The
only states without a significant pro-Republican bias either lack large cities
(e.g., Wyoming), contain dispersed African American populations (e.g.,
Mississippi), or possess non-urban clusters of white Democrats (e.g.,
Massachusetts).349
The very character of the American electoral system also may be
responsible for legislative misalignment, though this time of the policy
variety. A large literature analyzes how closely the policy preferences of the
median voter and of the governing party correspond under single-member
districts with plurality voting rules versus under proportional representation
(PR).350 Most of these studies find that PR systems systematically produce
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higher levels of correspondence.351 The inferior performance of U.S.-style
systems is due to both the vote-seat distortion that is common with plurality
voting rules and the smaller number of parties in these systems, which makes
it less likely that the governing party will reflect the views of the median
voter. In contrast, PR systems convert votes to seats with greater accuracy
and give rise to a larger number of parties, thus increasing the odds that the
governing party (or coalition) will capture the median voter’s preferences.
Finally, though this Article does not emphasize policy outcome
alignment,352 it is worth noting a few of the factors that may cause enacted
law not to match the median voter’s preferences even if the median
legislator’s views do. First, the median legislator may not get the
opportunity to vote on a bill favored by the median voter. Party leaders
maintain strict agenda control in most modern legislatures, and they often
have reasons not to permit popular legislation to be put to a vote.353 Second,
the median legislator rarely is the pivotal legislator whose consent is
necessary for a bill to pass. Committees that do not mirror the composition
of the entire body, supermajority voting rules, and the existence of two
chambers with distinct preference distributions are just some of the features
of American legislatures that bestow great power upon legislators located
away from the overall median.354 Third, even if the median legislator is the
pivotal legislator and even if she gets to vote on a bill, the executive, whose
consent also is necessary for the bill to be enacted, may not share the median
voter’s preferences. In a government with separated powers, both the median
legislator and the executive must hold the median voter’s views in order for
these views to be realized.
None of this should be construed as the counsel of despair. The right
kinds of election law rules certainly can exert an aligning influence, and
indeed can eliminate one form of misalignment—partisan misalignment
between the median voter and her representative—altogether. Moreover, that
some of the forces that cause voters’ and politicians’ preferences to diverge
are non-legal simply means that law reform cannot solve the problem of
misalignment by itself. It does not mean that the problem is unsolvable, or
that an effort that married legal, political, and institutional proposals would
be doomed to failure. It generally is the case that law alone cannot remake
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society. It should be no cause for gloom that the democratic sphere is not an
exception to this rule.
CONCLUSION
Election law doctrine has long been dominated by rights-and-interests
balancing: the weighing of the burdens imposed on individual rights by
electoral regulations against the state interests served by the regulations. For
the last fifteen years or so, the election law literature has emphasized
structural values that relate to the functional realities of the electoral system,
competition chief among them. In this Article, I have sought to introduce
and defend a new structural theory—the alignment approach—that has the
potential to reframe and unify many election law debates. The crux of the
approach is that voters’ and representatives’ preferences ought to be
congruent, with respect to both party and policy, at both the district and
legislative levels. Alignment is normatively attractive because it derives
from the basic definition of democracy itself. Alignment also is doctrinally
useful because it directs our attention to a key potential harm, misalignment,
in contexts including franchise restriction, party regulation, campaign
finance, redistricting, and minority representation.
The alignment approach walks a fine line between obviousness and
novelty. On the one hand, the notion that voters’ and representatives’
preferences should be congruent hardly is revolutionary. It is a similar idea
to the economists’ proposition that agents (here elected officials) should obey
principals (here the electorate), as well as to the median voter theorem of
political science, which asserts that candidates should converge on this
figure’s position.355 On the other hand, the courts very rarely have
acknowledged the importance of alignment in a democracy, and legal
scholars have been preoccupied to date with structural values other than
preference congruence. The argument that the purpose of elections is to
promote alignment—and that the purpose of election law should be to
facilitate their aligning role—has not previously been advanced in any sort of
systematic fashion. Again, I doubt that this thesis would strike anyone
engaged in the field as entirely unexpected. But there is still value in saying
something explicitly that until now has only been implicit. There is still
value in taking a claim that has long been inchoate and making it concrete.

355
See supra notes 9, 108 and accompanying text (discussing principal-agent perspective and median
voter theorem).
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